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Our lead article will be of interest to all judges who made child-custodydecisions as part of their work.  Psychologist Ira Turkat notes a sel-dom-discussed but critical point about child-custody evaluations con-
ducted by psychologists—there is no scientific data demonstrating the validity
of these reports.  Given that fact, he discusses questions judges should ask and
the framework within which these reports should be viewed.  He also notes a
recent Florida Court of Appeals case, Higginbotham v. Higginbotham (reprinted
at page 9), in which the court noted that a court-ordered psychological evalu-
ation had cost $20,000, an amount equal to the parties’ net worth, in a case in
which the appellate court considered the issues “neither complex nor volumi-
nous.”  The Florida appellate court is right to point out that judges should
carefully consider the costs attendant to these
investigations.  Dr. Turkat’s article provides
help in considering whether the benefits are
likely to exceed the costs for a given case.
We next have Professor Whitebread’s
annual review of the civil decisions of the past
Term of the United States Supreme Court.
The final year of the Rehnquist Court was per-
haps most noteworthy on the civil side for the
opinion upholding the use of eminent domain
for business-development purposes.  There
are other decisions of note as well; many
judges find Judge Whitebread’s overviews
helpful to make sure that new cases have not
been missed as each year rolls by.
We round out the issue with two student pieces.  First, we have one of the
winning papers in our law-student essay contest.  In it, Ryan Farley criticizes
a recent Ninth Circuit decision dealing with application of the Fourth
Amendment in searches of individuals entering the United States at its bor-
ders.  Second, we have a review by one of our student editors, Angela Brouse,
of the book, Courtroom 302, which goes behind the scenes of a busy Chicago
criminal court for the year 1998.  
I believe that the addition of our student editors will help us to continue
to have excellent contents in Court Review while also getting us back on
schedule.  We are in the first year of having regular student editors and have
selected editors for the coming year as well, with some continuity in the
process.  We are in catch-up mode, which should be good for you.  In the next
12 months, you will receive at least five issues, rather than the normal four.
And we have authors and articles in the pipeline that I am sure will be of inter-
est.  Please let me know (sleben@ix.netcom.com) if there are topics or authors
that you’d like to see in Court Review.  Please remember, too, that letters to the
editor reacting to what you’ve read or thoughts you’d like to address to other
judges are welcome.—SL
Court Review, the quarterly journal of the American
Judges Association, invites the submission of unsolicited,
original articles, essays, and book reviews.  Court Review
seeks to provide practical, useful information to the work-
ing judges of the United States and Canada.  In each issue,
we hope to provide information that will be of use to
judges in their everyday work, whether in highlighting
new procedures or methods of trial, court, or case man-
agement, providing substantive information regarding an
area of law likely to be encountered by many judges, or by
providing background information (such as psychology or
other social science research) that can be used by judges
in their work.  Guidelines for the submission of manu-
scripts for Court Review are set forth on page 39.  Court
Review reserves the right to edit, condense, or reject mate-
rial submitted for publication.
Court Review is in full text on LEXIS and is indexed in the
Current Law Index, the Legal Resource Index, and
LegalTrac.
Letters to the Editor, intended for publication, are wel-
come.  Please send such letters to Court Review’s editor:
Judge Steve Leben, 100 North Kansas Avenue, Olathe,
Kansas 66061, e-mail address:  sleben@ix.netcom.com.
Comments and suggestions for the publication, not
intended for publication, also are welcome.
Advertising: Court Review accepts advertising for prod-
ucts and services of interest to judges. For information,
contact Deloris Gager at (757) 259-1864.
Photo credit: Mary Watkins (marywatkinsphoto@
earthlink.net).  The cover photo is of the Surrogate’s
Courthouse in New York City, built from 1899 to 1907 at
a cost of more than $7 million.  The Surrogate’s
Courthouse, a designated New York City landmark, is
located at the corner of Chambers and Centre Streets in
downtown Manhattan.  For more information about the
building and its history, go to http://www.nyc.gov/html/
dcas/html/resources/man_surrogatecourt.shtml.
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United States.  Court Review is published quarterly by the
American Judges Association (AJA). AJA members
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paid at Williamsburg, Virginia, and additional mailing
offices.  Address all correspondence about subscriptions,
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It seems as if our Annual Conference in Anchorage took
place about a month ago, but it has been many months now
since we returned home and my job as president of AJA began.
Time seems to disappear and days become a blur when balanc-
ing the bench, AJA, and family.
Your officers and Executive Committee have totally
immersed themselves in revitalizing the AJA beginning with
plans for a great educational and fun-filled annual conference
in New Orleans in October.  In January, the Executive
Committee met for two days discussing our priorities and goals
for this year and the future of our organization.
Membership, as always, has been at the top of the discussion
list for as long as I have been a member of AJA.  Last year, the
leadership and Board of Governors authorized the funding of a
marketing campaign recently launched by a company called
Marketing General.  This professional marketing
group is now conducting a targeted campaign for
new members throughout the country.
Additionally, the Executive Committee, in
our own way of improving public relations,
authorized extending complimentary member-
ships to all presidents and vice presidents (or
presidents-elect) of all statewide judicial organi-
zations.  In introductory correspondence with
them, we are encouraging them to attend our
annual conference in New Orleans this year.  It is
our hope they will take a meaningful experience
back to their home organizations and promote the AJA.
One objective our organization has somewhat ignored has
been the aggressive approach to sponsorships and fundraising.
It is my firm belief that if this organization is to expand and
flourish, it is critical to obtain outside funding.  We, as judges,
face an obvious handicap as judicial ethics rules prohibit us
from soliciting any contributions or funding.  This is where I
need your help and suggestions.  Although some corporate
monies could be used for sponsoring social events, coffee
breaks, or meals, this most likely would be advertising dollars
from a corporation familiar to judges.  Any substantial amounts
of money would be and should be through the American
Judges Foundation, a 501(C)(3) corporation.  The AJF could
then contribute those monies to the educational programs of
AJA.  This would have the affect of freeing up the registration
monies for meals and social events rather than underwriting
the cost of our educational programs.  
How do we do this?  I have researched and investigated  out-
side fundraisers and found there are several specialties in this
profession.  There are general fundraisers, those who seek spon-
sors for specific events or projects, while others specialize in
philanthropic giving or grant money.  The costs of their services
are either on a project basis with a flat fee or on a per-diem basis
with daily expenses.  Per-diem rates generally range from $900
to $2,000 per day and most of these fundraisers will consult
with your organization and work with or train the volunteers of
your organization and guide them through the fundraising
process.  Either way, it is expensive.  I have also discovered most
fundraising professional associations consider fundraising, on a
contingency basis, to be unethical and require their members to
sign a pledge not to engage in this form of compensation.  The
question becomes, do we risk spending more money with the
possibility of securing money, or do we place this burden on the
officers and board members of the American Judges Foundation
with their thoughts as to a “game plan.”
Recent times have brought unwarranted criticism to mem-
bers of the judiciary throughout this country.  It is time to begin
our public relations work with our citizens at an earlier age.  It
is incumbent upon us to introduce the children of this country
to the judicial system with the hope that they will
understand and respect the role of judges as they
grow older.  With this thought in mind, we are
planning a type of community outreach program
at our annual conference in New Orleans.  I am
currently arranging to have an elementary class of
students brought to our conference site hotel for
an instructional class.  During this time the ele-
mentary students would be taught by one of our
colleagues through a demonstration of justice in
action.  Judges attending the conference would
observe, with the idea to train judges and for
them to be more comfortable in talking to elementary students
in their respective communities.  
Following the morning session, the participating judges will
then go into the classrooms through the Orleans Parish School
District and apply and use the lesson plan of the earlier morn-
ing session with the students.  We are looking at this project as
being beneficial to the judges on a long-term basis but also as a
public relations opportunity for the American Judges
Association.  
Judge Mary Celeste has put in a tremendous effort in putting
together an educational program that will offer something for
everyone.  She has worked extremely long hours and deserves
all of our thanks.
Judges Jim McKay, David Gorbaty, John Conery, and Oliver
Deleray are planning what sounds to be a spectacular social
program.  In spite of their personal suffering and inconve-
nience through Katrina, these judges are steadfast in their
desire to show us the true New Orleans style.  Of utmost
importance is the attendance of our Board of Governors at our
midyear meeting in Coeur d’Alene, Idaho, May 18-20, 2006.
Some of the issues presented in this article and other important
issues for our organization require their input and direction.  If
there was ever a time of opportunity for AJA, it begins now.  
I look forward to seeing everyone in May and in October.
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Courtroom 302:
How America’s Criminal Justice System Really Works
Angela M. Brouse
judge presiding over the bond hearing the rundown on each
alleged offender. As many as 77 hearings are conducted in as
few as 62 minutes. 
While the stories of Courtroom 302 as Bogira tells them are
absorbing, they are disturbing in that they rip away feelings of
security embedded in America’s common belief about the crim-
inal justice system. Instead, we are reminded of various factors
that serve to undermine justice. Throughout the courtroom
tales, Bogira weaves a picture of a justice system in which the
ultimate goal is to dispose of cases, rather than serve justice.
Bogira retells the history of police cover-ups and coerced con-
fessions in Cook County. We are introduced to the world of plea
bargaining and the “trial tax.” Several of the courtroom stories
hinge on constitutional violations of the defendants’ rights.
Bogira does an excellent job of framing the issues found in
Courtroom 302 and Cook County as small
examples of more prevalent problems in the
nation’s criminal justice system. 
Bogira thoroughly lays the scenario of
Cook County in the 1980s when
Lieutenant Jon Burge, commanding officer
of the violent crimes unit, and his men car-
ried out years of “systematic torture” of
criminal suspects to coerce confessions.
Years after this wrong was uncovered and
those involved were prosecuted, judges like
Locallo now rarely believe claims of torture
from defendants. 
Leroy Orange was sentenced to death in
1985. He is now before Judge Locallo in
Courtroom 302 asking for a new trial,
claiming he was brutally tortured by police
officials until he finally confessed to multi-
ple murders. Orange describes being suffo-
cated with plastic bags and given elec-
troshocks on multiple occasions. After
multiple defendants claimed consistent
methods of such torture, an investigation team uncovered that
at least 50 criminal suspects had indeed been tortured between
1973 and 1986. Although Orange’s allegations of police abuse
are consistent with findings of the investigation and his lawyer
presents medical testimony of marks found on Orange while
he was imprisoned, Judge Locallo denies his motion. The
judge is consistent in his rulings on motions to suppress a con-
fession by a defendant alleging coercion—out of at least 100
similar cases, Locallo has ruled in every single instance that the
defendant confessed voluntarily.  
Bogira conveys a common theme among the criminal justice
system known as the “sliding-scale” effect when judges rule on
motions to suppress confessions based on alleged police con-
STEVE BOGIRA, COURTROOM 302: A YEAR BEHIND THE SCENES IN AN
AMERICAN CRIMINAL COURTHOUSE. Alfred A. Knopf, 2005. 404
pp. $25.00. 
1998 was to be a big year for Courtroom 302 and the CookCounty Criminal Courthouse—the biggest and busiestfelony courthouse in the nation. Cook County alone
would send nearly 16,000 convicted criminals to prison.
Courtroom 302 and Judge Daniel Locallo would hear the con-
troversial Bridgeport trial, known as a “heater” case for attract-
ing publicity.  The case revolved around three young white
men, with supposed mafia ties, charged with the brutal beating
of a 13-year-old black boy—the alleged motive being that the
black boy was not welcome in the predominately white neigh-
borhood. Due to the violent and racial undertones in the
Bridgeport crime, Judge Locallo faced
pressure from Chicago’s mayor and other
influential figures among the community,
such as Jesse Jackson. “Heater” cases are
the exception to the norm, however. The
bulk of the year’s cases would be disposed
of quickly, with little thought or notice.
The great majority of defendants who
appeared in Courtroom 302 were African-
American drug offenders, many already
well acquainted with the Cook County
Criminal Courthouse. Amidst the daily
grind of the courtroom, 1998 also was a
reelection year for Judge Locallo.  
Steve Bogira’s depiction of a year in the
life of Courtroom 302 is unique in that the
reader dives into the minds of lawyers,
jurors, deputies, defendants, families of the
defendants and victims, and most impor-
tantly, Judge Locallo. Bogira provides
impartial illustrations of the courtroom
stories and manages to establish a signifi-
cant amount of trust from those he interviews, to the point that
he uncovers truths that never arose during attorney-client
interviews, or even during trial. At times it is shocking to learn
the reasoning played out in the minds of these courtroom
actors, especially those enlisted with serving justice, as many
willingly accept the “injustices” of the system. 
The readers’ first introduction to the Cook County Criminal
Courthouse is the vivid picture of alleged offenders being shuf-
fled into the back of the courthouse like cattle, and herded into
the lockups. Bogira thoroughly explains the process of bond
hearings—spending more time on his explanation than actual
defendants are given at their own hearings. The state’s attor-
neys and public defenders have 15 seconds each to give the
g B O O K  R E V I E W
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duct. Essentially, the bigger the case, the more likely police are
to lie. Conversely, judges are less likely to challenge an officer’s
actions and suppress evidence in “heater” cases—even if a
judge suspects the officer is lying. Bogira states the general rule
among criminal courts in Chicago is “the hotter the heater, the
less likely the judge will protect the defendant’s constitutional
rights.” Bogira reasons that judges do not suppress evidence in
“heater” cases because of personal revulsion of a violent crime
or fear of adverse publicity. 
Bogira demonstrates many examples of the plea-bargaining
process that is so common in Courtroom 302. It appears that
the concept of rehabilitation is completely lost within this sys-
tem. The proper sentence is based on whatever both sides can
agree upon.  
Although defendants have a constitutional right to a trial by
a jury of their peers, common practice reveals that is not
always the case in Courtroom 302. Bogira outlines judges’ use
of the “trial tax,” where a defendant pays in the form of a stiffer
sentence for choosing trial over a plea bargain if he is eventu-
ally unsuccessful at trial. A guilty plea can be wrapped up in
approximately 20 minutes, where a jury trial usually takes any-
where from two days to a week, along with posttrial motions
and a sentencing hearing if the jury convicts. The markup is
the highest when the defendant chooses a jury trial over a
bench trial. This is merely one example given by Bogira in
which a constitutional right is impeded in the interest of judi-
cial efficiency. 
Bogira portrays Judge Locallo as a likable character. He is
compassionate when allowing contact visits among defendants
and their families, and seems to be well liked among juries.
There are instances, however, where even the judge is caught
up in the injustices of the criminal system. Judge Locallo often
ponders how judgments and sentences given in the courtroom
will affect the upcoming election. Locallo seems to be popular
among defense lawyers, although prosecutors consider the
judge to be soft in sentencing. They claim it is common knowl-
edge that Locallo has his focus set on the appellate court and
he needs to please the defense bar to meet this goal.  
During one of Bogira’s conversations with Judge Locallo, he
states that the 30 trial courtrooms at the 26th Street court-
house “are like 30 different countries.” The sentencing stan-
dards vary greatly from courtroom to courtroom. Locallo has
given probation to defendants who likely would have received
double-digit prison terms from other judges. When consider-
ing the sentence of a convicted defendant, Locallo accounts for
the background and status of the victim, but not the offender.
Bogira emphasizes that luck is the deciding factor in the sen-
tencing process; a defendant’s fate may hinge on a judge’s
mood, the jury pool, or whether a lawyer is fully prepared and
in top form. 
The reader also is sent back in time to Locallo’s days as a
prosecutor and his most significant case—the prosecution of
George Jones. The claim was based on a home invasion that led
to the rape and murder of a twelve-year-old girl. Jones was
cleared of all charges when a “frightening abuse of power by
members of the Chicago police force” was uncovered. Street
detectives made a habit of utilizing a double-filing system
when collecting evidence in relation to a crime. Somehow doc-
uments included in street files, usually containing mitigating
evidence in favor of the defendant, never made their way into
the office files handed over to state prosecutors.  Locallo
claimed to have no knowledge of the cover-up and was not
found liable, although many of the other state actors were con-
victed. To this day he believes Jones was guilty, and that by
suppressing evidence, the police were merely doing what was
customary when it was believed a defendant was guilty. This
experience as a prosecutor may be relevant to Judge Locallo’s
unwillingness to find police corruption when defendants claim
a confession was involuntarily coerced from them.  
Although many shortcomings of the American criminal jus-
tice system are evident through the personal accounts of
Courtroom 302, the reader is often reminded that certain
“injustices” are the only way to deal with overcrowded court-
rooms and prisons.  Justice has evolved to cope with the
world’s highest rate of imprisonment, mostly due to the war on
drugs. For readers not familiar with the system, Courtroom
302 may come as a surprise because this is not how most
Americans believe their criminal justice system works, espe-
cially with the current popularity of television shows where
the evidence and the state are always right. Those working as
part of the system will find the book confirms much that they
already know, but may also offer much they do not know.
Bogira’s underlying themes serve as a good reminder that our
system is far from perfect and justice often falls short. 
Angela M. Brouse, a second-year law student at the University of
Missouri–Kansas City School of Law, is a student editor for Court
Review.
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COEUR  D’ALENE, IDAHO
MAY 18-20, 2006
Coeur d’Alene (pronounced core-da-
lane), 31 miles east of Spokane,
Washington, is a lakefront resort commu-
nity in one of the prettiest settings in the
Western United States—overlooking
Lake Coeur d’Alene and flanked by the
foothills of the Bitterroot  Mountains.
Our 2006 midyear conference will be at
the Coeur d’Alene Resort, called
America’s top mainland resort by Conde
Nast Traveler and one of America’s top
10 golf resorts by Golf Digest magazine.
AJA’s midyear meeting usually includes
one or two continuing judicial education
programs, plus business meetings of the
AJA Board of Governors.
NEW  ORLEANS, LOUISIANA
OCTOBER 8-13, 2006
AJA will return to New Orleans, site of
some of our most successful annual con-
ferences, for the 2006 annual conference.
We look forward to renewing acquain-
tance with many of our Louisiana mem-
bers who—along with their courts—have
been displaced. AJA’s annual conference
usually includes 12 to 15 hours of contin-
uing judicial education, business meetings
of the AJA Board of Governors and
General Assembly (all members), cultural
programs, entertainment, and free time to
explore.
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Footnotes
1. Ira Daniel Turkat, Custody Battle Burnout, 28 AM. J. FAM. THERAPY
201 (2000).
2. Thus, this article focuses only on cases of this kind and not “slam-
dunk” cases (e.g., where one parent has repeatedly and recently
sexually abused a child in public whereas the other parent has no
such history, is stable, and loving toward the child).
3. James N. Bow & Francella A. Quinnell, Psychologists’ Current
Practices and Procedures in Child Custody Evaluations Five Years
After American Psychological Association Guidelines, 32 PROF.
PSYCHOL. 261 (2001).
4. Leah S. Horvath, T.K. Logan & Robert Walker, Child Custody
Cases: A Content Analysis of Evaluations in Practice, 33 PROF.
PSYCHOL. 557 (2002).
5. Higginbotham v. Higginbotham, 857 So. 2d 341, 342 (Fla. App.
2003).  See also Hastings v. Rigbee, 875 So. 2d 772, 778 n.1 (Fla.
App. 2004)  (urging careful consideration of costs, such as par-
enting coordinators, as compared to income of parties before such
resources are used).
6. Lyn R. Greenberg & Jonathan W. Gould, The Treating Expert: A
Hybrid Role with Firm Boundaries, 32 PROF. PSYCHOL. 469 (2001).
7. Ira Daniel Turkat, Questioning the Mental Health Expert’s Custody
Report, 7 AM. J. FAM. L. 175 (1993).
8. American Psychological Association, Guidelines for Child Custody
Evaluations in Divorce Proceedings, 49 AM. PSYCHOL. 677 (1994).
9. In some states (e.g., California), however, the licensing board
requires that psychologists adhere to APA guidelines.
Child-custody litigation is typically hostile, stressful, andexpensive.  For thousands of years, society has wrestledwith the issue of properly assigning custody of children
when parents fight over it.  In King Solomon’s court, there were
no licensed psychologists to extensively interview families,
apply psychological tests, and offer recommendations.  Today,
it is commonplace in our society to have psychologists evalu-
ate families litigating over custody.  
In the United States, approximately 100,000 custody battles
take place each year.1 However, psychological evaluations are
not ordered in all contested custody cases.  By and large, a cus-
tody investigation is ordered when it is unclear who should be
designated as the primary residential parent2  and when there
are resources available to pay for the examination.
Custody evaluations can be pricey.  Results of a nationwide
survey of psychologists in 2001 in the United States revealed
that the average charge for a custody evaluation was $3,335, top-
ping out at $15,000.3 While some jurisdictions provide pro-
grams that offer custody investigations at reduced cost,4 fees
exceeding the nationwide survey maximum have been reported.
In 2003, the Florida Court of Appeal noted that one psycholo-
gist charged $20,000—an amount equal to the parties’ entire net
worth, and questioned how it could be in a child’s best interest
for the family’s resources to be depleted by fees of this magni-
tude.5 There are no statistics available in the psychological lit-
erature that measure the degree to which custody evaluations
influence judicial decisions, but there is little question that these
investigations affect the lives of those so evaluated.6
In light of the impact of custody examinations on families
litigating over such matters, it is important to understand how
well these investigations perform.  Are families getting their
money’s worth?  Do the recommendations stemming from these
evaluations represent the best possible custodial arrangements?
These are the fundamental questions underlying an order for a
psychological evaluation of a family litigating over custody. 
To answer these questions properly, one should rely on
sound scientific data.  More specifically, well-conducted scien-
tific research should tell us: (1) how a child’s best interest will
be served by being placed primarily with one parent over the
other; and (2) how to identify the parent who can best serve
that interest.  Custody recommendations to the court should
flow from such research.
SCIENTIFIC EVALUATION OF 
CUSTODY RECOMMENDATIONS
More than a decade ago, in 1993, I reviewed the state of sci-
entific data supporting custody-evaluation reports and found
that the lack of good data caused clear problems for judges:
Currently, there is no clear-cut body of scientific
data about some of the basic questions that underlie a
custody recommendation. For example, there is an
absence of strong scientific evidence regarding precise
parenting characteristics that guarantee “good parent-
ing.” Similarly, we lack sound research data regarding
the effects on the future of a child who’s been placed
with the “wrong” parent.  Given the absence of well-
established scientific data on these issues, this leaves
the mental health professional with tremendous leeway
in regard to how he or she decides to go about doing a
custody evaluation and in the interpretation of the data
collected for that investigation. As such, what one
mental health expert might see as critical, another sim-
ilarly trained professional might see as trivial. This
leaves the court in a terrible quandary—one of which
the court, at times, may not even be aware.7
One year later, the American Psychological Association
(APA) issued guidelines for conducting custody evaluations.8
The APA guidelines are not based on scientific evidence and
are limited in nature.  The APA guidelines offer non-manda-
tory recommendations9 about the psychologist’s role in con-
ducting custody evaluations, such as maintaining an impartial
On the Limitations of 
Child-Custody Evaluations
Ira Daniel Turkat
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10. Daniel A. Krauss & Bruce D. Sales, Legal Standards, Expertise, and
Experts in the Resolution of Contested Child Custody Cases, 6
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL. & L. 866 (2000).
11. Corina Benjet, Sandra T. Azar & Regina Kuersten-Hogan,
Evaluating the Parental Fitness of Psychiatrically Diagnosed
Individuals: Advocating a Functional-Contextual Analysis of
Parenting, 17 J. FAM. PSYCHOL. 238 (2003).
12. Barbara Jameson, Marion F. Ehrenberg & Michael A. Hunter,
Psychologists’ Ratings of the Best-Interests-of-the-Child Custody and
Access Criterion: A Family Systems Assessment Model, 28 PROF.
PSYCHOL. 253 (1997).
stance, keeping the child’s best interest paramount, and obtain-
ing informed consent. The guidelines do not specify what
interview format to follow, what tests to administer, or what
particular family data should be generated in order to lead to a
particular custodial recommendation.
In 2000, a review of the psychological literature on custody
evaluations revealed that the scientific basis for these investi-
gations remained highly deficient, leading the reviewers to a
conclusion of significant concern about the usefulness of these
evaluations:
One of the primary problems with child custody
evaluations is that the assessment of a child’s best inter-
est necessarily involves a future prediction by a psy-
chologist. A psychologist must somehow forecast how
a particular child is likely to be psychologically
adjusted several years postdivorce on the basis of a
myriad of complex factors and interactions. It is well-
noted that psychologists as a group are particularly
inaccurate in making future behavioral predictions and
may even be more inaccurate than lay persons are.10
More than a decade has passed since the APA guidelines
were issued, yet current research indicates that scientifically
validated tools to assess parenting competency are still not
available.11  If custody evaluations by psychologists are not sci-
entifically validated, what then is the court getting when it
orders examinations of this kind to take place?  This article
sees to provide judges with an answer to this critical question. 
CUSTODY EVALUATION COMPONENTS
When a psychologist conducts a child-custody investiga-
tion, the tasks executed typically are:
• Interviewing key litigation participants;
• Administering psychological tests;
• Conducting observations of the parents and offspring;
• Conceptualizing the results of 1-3; and
• Making recommendations to the court.  
Interviewing. Psychologists have yet to agree upon what vari-
ables should be evaluated in a custody investigation;12 thus,
there is no scientifically accepted interview format for con-
ducting a custody evaluation.  The design of the interviews will
vary across evaluators and, quite likely, the quality of these
interviews will vary as well.  At the present time, it is up to the
evaluator to choose what questions will be asked, not the scientific
literature.  In the absence of scientific validity, there is no
David Higginbotham v. Marianne Higginbotham
n/k/a Marianne Vacchio
Florida Court of Appeals
857 So. 2d 341
Opinion filed October 17, 2003
We affirm the decision of the trial court in this matter
but write on areas that otherwise cause us concern.
Dissolution of marriage cases are fraught with anxiety,
emotion, and uncertainty. This case involves a seven-year
marriage with three minor children. The issues were nei-
ther complex nor voluminous.
This court has previously expressed concern about par-
ties spending limited resources that are otherwise needed
for the welfare of the children. See Wrona v. Wrona, 592
So. 2d 694 (Fla. App. 1991). Here, the trial court signed
a stipulated order appointing a licensed psychologist to
perform a parenting assessment . . . .  The psychologist
selected was from Manatee County. The Husband’s gross
monthly income was $5,446 including overtime, and the
Wife’s gross monthly income was $1,560. The assets of
the parties were modest. The cost of the twenty-nine-page
parenting assessment was $ 20,000. Scant mention was
made of the assessment in the amended final judgment.
If a judicial system is trying to reach a child placement
decision in the best interest of the child, it is difficult to
grasp how it is in the best interest of the child to deplete
the resources of the family to this extent. The concept
should be to devise a more cost-effective way of doing a
parenting assessment or fashion a court order that would
set a financial cap on the amount to be expended, with
appropriate directions to the party performing the assess-
ment. The expert, without guidance from the court, may
feel compelled to perform an array of tests not otherwise
necessary. In fact, the parenting assessment in question
delineated that fourteen psychological tests were per-
formed regarding the parents and seven psychological
tests were performed regarding two of the parties’ three
children.
The cost of the parenting assessment here was 24% of
the parties’ combined gross annual income and 100% of
the parties’ net worth as reflected on the Husband’s finan-
cial affidavit.
Affirmed.
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objective way to know whether the interviews in any particu-
lar case are designed well or poorly, executed with skill or
error, and/or contribute to or detract from the best custodial
arrangement being ordered by the court. 
Psychological testing. Since there is no scientifically accepted
protocol for psychological testing of custody litigation partici-
pants,13 the assessment instruments chosen for a custody eval-
uation will depend ultimately on the individual preferences of
the psychologist.  In the absence of scientific evidence to guide
custody examinations, a family that is evaluated by psycholo-
gist A may receive a very different evaluation than if seen by
psychologist B or C.  Where psychologist A may choose to use
tests D, E, and F routinely, psychologist B may prefer tests G,
H, I, and J, while psychologist C may not adopt any standard
testing regimen.  There are more than 2,000 psychological tests
available commercially to psychologists.14 While judges may
recognize the names of popular tests,15 such as the MMPI16 or
Rorschach, it would be erroneous to assume that these psy-
chological assessment instruments are scientifically validated
for performing custody evaluations: there simply is no scien-
tific evidence that these tests identify the “right” parent in cus-
tody litigation.
Observations. It would seem intuitive that to make predic-
tions about how parents and children will behave with each
other in the future, one would need to observe their current
interactions.  With no scientific-research base to determine
whether such observations are necessary and, if so, how they
should be conducted, it should come as no surprise that psy-
chologists differ among themselves in how they conduct such
observations.17 Whether each parent should be viewed with
each child once, twice, or not at all, and, if seen, under what
conditions (e.g., performing a difficult task together, playing a
game together, discussing a particular topic), has yet to be
established by a body of systematic psychological research.
Conceptualization of data. Because there is no consensual sci-
entific guidance for interpreting the data collected during a
custody evaluation, the appointed evaluator has tremendous
discretion in determining what information to focus on or
gloss over, assign weights of importance, or disregard com-
pletely.  This leaves the psychologist with considerable power
accompanied by virtually no oversight.  While the evaluator
may be subject to questioning by the bench and by counsel,
these individuals are usually not practicing psychologists.   
In the absence of scientific evidence, two custody evaluators
viewing the exact same data set on a family could provide two
very different interpretations.18 These interpretations will
reflect the “leanings” of each psychologist toward particular
interview, test, and observational data—or what the dictionary
defines as bias.  According to Webster’s Revised Unabridged
Dictionary, bias is the “leaning of the mind” or “propensity or
prepossession toward an object or view.”  When scientific evi-
dence to support a choice of evaluation instrument is lacking
and when there is no professional consensus on the matter, the
assessment tool chosen reflects the biases or “leanings” of the
evaluator.  The same holds true for interpretations of the con-
stellation of interview, test, and observational data collected on
a particular family.  
Custody recommendations. Given that interview format, test
selection, observational approach, and data interpretation are
more likely influenced by the biases of the evaluator than by
scientific evidence, it should come as no surprise that recom-
mendations regarding timesharing and custodial placement
suffer from the same weakness.  In the field of psychology, there
are no scientifically validated and uniformly accepted timesharing
and custodial placement guidelines.19 Thus, when a psychologist
offers custody recommendations, he or she is offering an opin-
ion that could differ significantly from another psychologist’s
interpretation of the same family data.  And because psycholo-
gists involved in family-law cases can make mistakes in their
evaluations, diagnoses, and treatment recommendations,20
when two psychologists differ in their conclusions, it also is
possible that both may be wrong.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE JUDICIARY
In a nutshell, courts appropriately seek guidance from men-
tal-health practitioners when ruling on fateful issues like child-
custody determinations, but the scientific literature these clin-
icians rely upon is inadequate to support the needs of the
court.21 Child-custody evaluations have significant limitations.
What then should be done?  Should the courts continue to
order psychological investigations of families contesting cus-
tody?  Should psychologists refrain from conducting these
examinations?  
At the present time, there are no easy answers to these ques-
tions.  In fact, psychologists themselves disagree as to whether
or not they should be offering child-custody recommendations
to the court.22 Despite the lack of professional consensus and
scientific validity, there are no indications at present that
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courts and attorneys will stop ordering child-custody investi-
gations.  Thus, we come to this question: How can the court
improve its utilization of these evaluations despite their signif-
icant limitations? To this end, consider this list of recommen-
dations for consideration:
Assign an appropriate weight to the custody report. It is imper-
ative to understand that there is no scientific evidence that a
better ruling will be made when a custody evaluation is done
versus when one hasn’t been done.  Furthermore, contrary to
what the general public might expect, there is no scientific evi-
dence that a psychologist is any better at determining the best
custodial placement compared to a judge, an attorney, or a
layperson.  As such, when a custody recommendation seems
based on clear-cut convincing evidence, it likely deserves
greater consideration than a recommendation lacking it.  
Recognize that quantity may not mean quality. When a psy-
chologist performs a multitude of tests or engages in extensive
interviewing, these activities may suggest the evaluation is
comprehensive.  However, a mechanic can inspect a malfunc-
tioning automobile extensively yet still recommend the wrong
course of action.  In the case mentioned earlier of a family
being charged $20,000 for a custody evaluation, the Florida
Court of Appeal pointed out that the psychologist’s 29-page
assessment report seemed to have little, if any impact on the
trial court’s ruling.23 A custody evaluation may appear more
thorough when a psychologist generates a large amount of
information on a family, but it should also be noted that such
activity also increases the opportunity for more errors to be
made.24 There is no scientific evidence that a more intense cus-
tody evaluation leads to a better custodial recommendation. 
Differentiate overt behavior from verbal report. Behaviors
such as a child crying and a parent hugging one’s offspring are
overt, objectively measurable, and potentially incontrovertible.
The child either cried or didn’t.  A hug was provided or it was-
n’t.  On the other hand, what one parent says about a child cry-
ing or what a psychologist says about a parent’s attitudes are
more subject to error than overt nonverbal behaviors.
Psychological research has shown for some time that overt
nonverbal behavior is less prone to distortion than verbal
reports of behavior.25 Thus, when considering the contents of
a custody-investigation report as part of the evidentiary record,
greater confidence can be placed in the overt behaviors dis-
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played compared to individuals’ reports about behavior.   This
does not mean that all verbal statements should be discounted;
clearly, some assertions convey critical information.  However,
a prominent psychology professor captured the issue well
when he said, “People can tell you anything, but behavior
doesn’t lie.”26 
Differentiate between facts and interpretations. Consistent
with the above distinction, the scientific literature shows gen-
erally that when observing interactions among individuals and
providing explanations, “people agree about behavior but not
about its causes.”27 Thus, when a parent comes to watch a
child’s soccer game, that parent’s presence is typically a readily
agreed-upon fact.  However, why the parent came to the soccer
game could be open to debate, ranging from loving intentions
to manipulative motives.  When studying a custody report,
focusing on the behavior of the litigants over the interpreta-
tions provided makes the reader less dependent on the expla-
nations themselves, which are prone to bias.  
Recognize that quantitative information from psychological
tests may not be as useful as desired. Test scores, quantitative
indices, and statistical profiles are useful tools of the psychol-
ogist—when used appropriately.  As noted earlier, there are no
scientifically accepted psychological tests for performing a cus-
tody evaluation, yet the overwhelming majority of custody
evaluators use them.28 Further, the 2,000+ tests that psycholo-
gists can choose from differ from one another in many
respects, such as the amount of scientific research available on
the test, the degree to which the test has been validated, and
whether or not the test has ever been used in research on cus-
tody litigants.  At minimum, the custody evaluator should be
able to articulate for the judge why a particular test was cho-
sen for use over others, what deficiencies exist with the chosen
test, and what limitations apply to the meaning of the test
numbers generated in regard to the family at hand.   While
quantitative information can give an air of objectivity, it may or
may not represent valid or practically useful information.
Psychologists themselves indicated in a nationwide survey that
they find psychological tests to be less influential when con-
ducting a custody evaluation compared to interviewing and
observing the parents and children.29
Properly consider the source. A judge should not be swayed
by the recommendations of a psychologist merely because he
or she knows the psychologist, likes the psychologist, or
respects his or her credentials.  Heading a professional group
or being involved in bar activities does not validate scientifi-
cally the value of such a psychologist’s custody recommenda-
tions.  The fact that a clinician has performed 500 custody
evaluations does not mean that there is scientific evidence to
support his or her custody recommendations over someone
who hasn’t conducted that number of evaluations.30 The most
objective source of information is the overt behavior of the lit-
igation participants themselves, devoid of verbal reports about
their behavior—even if those reports are made by the most
experienced and reputable custody evaluator.
Hold high expectations for a custody report. Given the lack of
scientific validity for custody evaluations, some might suggest
lowering expectations for what a psychological report should
deliver.  This would be a mistake.  The bench should take a
dim view of any custody-evaluation report that fails to be of
the highest caliber.  In the absence of scientific support for
these reports, certain issues should receive considerable atten-
tion when reviewing them.  For example, does the psycholo-
gist’s description of the parties and events mesh well with what
has been observed in the courtroom?  If it doesn’t, why is that?
Is there a straightforward and logical rationale for the custody
recommendations that fits the rest of the evidence in the case?
It should.  Does all of the information the psychologist gath-
ered lead directly to precise recommendations that appear con-
vincing?  If not, why doesn’t it?  These questions represent the
minimal kind of analysis that the court should undertake when
evaluating custody-report recommendations.
CONCLUSION
The stakes are high when a family litigates over child cus-
tody.  In the worst-case scenario, the offspring are assigned to
the wrong parent and a suffering unfolds that cannot be
undone.  This possibility alone provides ample justification for
judges to seek the best advice they can when making decisions
about child placement.
With mental-health professionals appearing in courtrooms
to assist with child-custody determinations, it is not unreason-
able to hope that their input would be based on a strong sci-
entific foundation.  Just as a physician can rely on the latest
research evidence on antibiotics to guide interventions for
infections, one would like to believe that psychologists’ cus-
tody recommendations are validated scientifically.
Unfortunately, this is not the case.  Not one scientific study has
appeared that proves that the child-custody recommendations
offered by psychologists lead to better lives for the children
participating in these evaluations.  Yet custody investigations
can produce serious consequences for the children involved.
Some consequences may be positive, but unfortunately, the
consequences can also be quite negative.  This leaves the fam-
ilies litigating over custody in less than optimal circumstances
when they are ordered to participate in psychological exami-
nations. 
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At present, it would appear that custody evaluators’ recom-
mendations are more likely to be influenced by the evaluators’
respective biases than by scientific findings.  The role of eval-
uator bias in custody investigations has yet to be adequately
investigated by psychologists.
In light of the current scientific status of custody evalua-
tions, judges are encouraged to view psychologists’ timeshar-
ing and placement proposals with a critical eye.  The recom-
mendations presented here for inspecting a custody-evaluation
report should prove helpful.
Hopefully, the scientific foundation to support custody rec-
ommendations will develop strongly in the future so that the
court can come to rely more assuredly on psychological exper-
tise.  Families litigating over custody need the current limita-
tions of custody recommendations to be overcome.   When
proper research evidence accumulates, judges will be able to
place greater faith in the guidance offered by custody evalua-
tors.
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As I noted in reviewing the past term’s criminal deci-sions,1 what turned out to be the final year for theRehnquist Court produced no blockbuster rulings.
Nonetheless, there were several civil decisions of note.  The
Court’s 5-4 ruling upholding the taking of private property for
economic development purposes and two First Amendment
cases involving public display of the Ten Commandments in a
courthouse and in a school were among those receiving the
most public attention.
FIFTH AMENDMENT TAKINGS
In a 5-4 decision, in Kelo v. City of New London,2 the Court
held that the taking of private property for the purpose of eco-
nomic development satisfied the “public use” requirement of
the Fifth Amendment.  Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of
the Court while Justice O’Connor led the dissent.  New
London, Connecticut was declared a “distressed municipality”
by the State.  Local and state officials targeted the area for eco-
nomic revitalization and “[t]o this end, the respondent New
London Development Corporation (NLDC), a private non-
profit entity established some years earlier to assist the City in
planning economic development, was reactivated.” The NLDC
formally submitted plans for the city’s rejuvenation and,
“[u]pon obtaining state-level approval . . . finalized an inte-
grated development plan focused on 90 acres of the Fort
Trumbull area.” The area targeted by NLDC comprised, in part,
“privately owned properties.” The plan was approved in 2000.
“The city council also authorized the NLDC to purchase prop-
erty or to acquire property by exercising eminent domain in
the City’s name.” Most of the private property in the area was
successfully purchased by NLCD; however, “negotiations with
the petitioners failed.” In December 2000, the petitioners
brought an action in state court, claiming among other things,
that the taking of their properties would violate the “public
use” restriction in the Fifth Amendment.” 
The Court began by restating the basic principles of a State’s
eminent-domain power: “On the one hand, it has long been
accepted that the sovereign may not take the property of A for
the sole purpose of transferring it to another private party B.”
However, “it is equally clear that a State may transfer property
from one private party to another if future ‘use by the public’
is the purpose of the taking.” According to the Court,
“[n]either of these propositions . . . determines the disposition
of this case.” First, the property is not being taken for private
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purposes: “[t]he takings before us . . . would be executed pur-
suant to a carefully considered development plan,” and there
was no evidence that the City’s purposes are illegitimate.
Second, “this is not a case in which the City is planning to
open the condemned land – at least not in its entirety – to use
by general public.” Even so, the Court has long since rejected
that “public use” be determined by whether the land will be
used by the public in favor of asking whether the land will be
used for a “public purpose.” The question then, according to
the Court, was not whether the public will use the condemned
land, but whether the City’s development plan served a “pub-
lic purpose.” The Court stated that it has “defined that concept
broadly, reflecting our longstanding policy of deference to leg-
islative judgments in this field.”
After a discussion of its previous decisions, the Court stated
that the City’s plan for “economic rejuvenation is entitled to
our deference.” The Court also concluded that “[g]iven the
comprehensive character of the plan, the thorough delibera-
tion that preceded its adoption, and the limited scope of our
review, it is appropriate for us . . . to resolve the challenges of
the individual owners, not on a piecemeal basis, but rather in
light of the entire plan.” The Court declined to create a bright-
line rule that disqualifies economic development for “public
use”: “Promoting economic development is a traditional and
long accepted function of government,” and the Court saw “no
principled way of distinguishing economic development from
the other public purposes that we have recognized.” Further,
the Court recognized that, as here, “[t]he public end may be as
well or better served through an agency of private enterprise
than through a department of government – or so the Congress
might conclude.” 
Justice O’Connor, leading the dissent, believed the Court
has abandoned a “long-held, basic limitation on government
power” and the Court’s holding made all private property “vul-
nerable to being taken and transferred to another private
owner, so long as it might be upgraded.” She would hold that
economic takings are not constitutional because, generally,
“any lawful use of real private property can be said to generate
some incidental benefit to the public.” Justice Thomas, who
joined Justice O’Connor, also wrote separately because he
believed that “[i]f such ‘economic development’ takings are for
‘public use,’ any taking is, and the Court has erased the Public
Use Clause from our Constitution.”
Recent Civil Decisions of the
United States Supreme Court:
The 2004-2005 Term
Charles H. Whitebread
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HABEAS CORPUS 
Justice O’Connor delivered the opinion of the Court in
Rhines v. Weber,3 which finally affirmed the federal courts’ stay-
and-abeyance procedure in the context of federal habeas peti-
tions filed under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996 (AEDPA).  The Court held that a district court may
issue a stay to hold a habeas petition in abeyance while the
petitioner returns to state court to exhaust his unexhausted
claims if the court believed: (1) there is good cause why the
petitioner failed to previously exhaust his claims; (2) the
claims are not without merit; and (3) it imposes a time limit
upon the petitioner in which to exhaust those claims.  The
petitioner Charles Russell Rhines was sentenced to death after
being convicted of first-degree murder and third-degree bur-
glary.  His conviction became final on December 2, 1996, and
on December 5, 1996, the petitioner filed his state habeas peti-
tion.  His request for relief was denied, and the petitioner filed
for federal habeas relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 2254
within the one-year statutory period.  Almost two years later,
the District Court determined that eight of the petitioner’s
claims had not been exhausted.  By this time, the one-year
statute of limitations had run.  The District Court, however,
granted the petitioner’s motion and issued a stay to hold the
petitioner’s petition in abeyance “while he presented his unex-
hausted claims to the South Dakota courts.”  The Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit “vacated the stay and remanded
the case to the District Court to determine whether Rhines
could proceed by deleting unexhausted claims from his peti-
tion.” 
The Court determined that the stay-and-abeyance proce-
dure used by the District Court was appropriate.  In Rose v.
Lundy,4 which was decided fourteen years prior to Congress’s
adoption of AEDPA, the Court held that “federal district courts
may not adjudicate mixed petitions for habeas corpus, that is,
petitions containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims.”
The Court reasoned that the interests of comity and federalism
dictate that state courts must have the first opportunity to
decide a petitioner’s claim.  When the Court decided Lundy,
however, there was no statute of limitations on filing a federal
habeas petition.  Therefore, it was relatively easy for the peti-
tioners to return to state court to exhaust their previously
unexhausted claims before returning to federal court.  The
“enactment of AEDPA in 1996 dramatically altered the land-
scape for federal habeas corpus petitions.” The Court wrote:
“Although the limitations period is tolled during the pendency
of a ‘properly filed application for State post-conviction or
other collateral review,’ . . . the filing of a petition for habeas
corpus in federal court does not toll the statute of limitation.”
Therefore, many petitioners who come to federal court with
mixed petitions risk the loss of federal review of their unex-
hausted claims.  
To alleviate this problem, some courts had adopted the
“stay-and-abeyance” procedure.  The Court believed this to be
an appropriate remedy, stating that “under this procedure,
rather than dismiss the mixed petition pursuant to Lundy, a
district court might stay the
petition and hold it in
abeyance while the petitioner
returns to state court to
exhaust his previously unex-
hausted claims.”  The Court
went on to explain that typi-
cally, district courts have the
authority to enter stays
“where such a stay would be
a proper exercise of discre-
tion.”  The AEDPA does not
limit this power.  The Court believed, however, that the proce-
dure should be “compatible with AEDPA’s purposes: (1) to
reduce delays in the execution of state and federal criminal
sentences; and (2) require prisoners to seek state relief first,
thereby streamlining federal habeas proceedings.”  The Court
concluded that the frequent use of the stay-and-abeyance pro-
cedure would “undermine these twin purposes” and, therefore,
believed it should only be available in the circumstances dis-
cussed above: (1) where “the district court determined there
was good cause for the petitioner’s failure to exhaust his claims
first in state court;” (2) the unexhausted claims are not merit-
less; and (3) the petitioner acts with diligence to exhaust his
unexhausted claims.
Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of a 5-3 Court in
Brown v. Payton,5 which held the California state court’s deter-
mination that the instruction given in a death-penalty trial
with regard to the “catch-all” provision of California Penal
Code section 190.3 and its failure to declare a mistrial after the
prosecutor misstated the law during closing argument was not
an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent.
Chief Justice Rehnquist took no part in the decision.
The respondent William Payton was tried and convicted for
one count of rape and murder and two counts of attempted
murder.  During the penalty phase of the trial, the defense
focused on Payton’s actions after the crimes, in particular that
Payton “participated in prison Bible study classes and a prison
ministry, and had a calming effect on other prisoners.”  The
trial judge gave an instruction, which followed the text of
California Penal Code section 190.3, which “set[s] forth 11
different factors, labeled (a) through (k), for the jury to ‘con-
sider, take into account and be guided by’ in determining
whether to impose a sentence of life imprisonment or death.”
Factor (k), which is a “catch-all instruction,” directs the jurors
to consider “any other circumstance which extenuates the
gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the
crime.”  During closing arguments, the prosecutor argued that
“factor (k) did not allow . . . [the jury] to consider anything
that happened ‘after the [crime] or later.’” The defense
objected and moved for mistrial on grounds that the prosecu-
tor misstated the law.  The court declined.  The jury returned
a verdict of death and the respondent was sentenced.
On direct appeal to the California Supreme Court, Payton
argued that the jury was “led to believe it could not consider
3. 544 U.S. 269 (2005).
4. 455 U.S. 509 (1982).
5. 544 U.S. 133 (2005).
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the mitigating evidence of his
post-conviction conduct . . .
in violation of the Eighth
Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution.” The California
Supreme Court rejected the
claim, applying United States
Supreme Court’s decision in
Boyde v. California,6 “which
had considered the constitu-
tionality of the same factor
(k) instruction,” and deter-
mined that “in the context of
the proceedings there was no reasonable likelihood that
Patyon’s jury believed it was required to disregard his mitigat-
ing evidence.” Payton subsequently filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus in the District Court.  
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 (AEDPA), a federal court’s review is limited and it “may
not grant relief unless the state court’s adjudication of the claim
resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” The
Court determined that the state court’s decision was not an
unreasonable application of the law.  The state court properly
identified Boyde at the commencement of its analysis.  In
Boyde, the Court held that the text of factor (k) did not “limit
the jury’s consideration of extenuating circumstances solely to
circumstances of the crime.” Therefore, it determined that fac-
tor (k) did not preclude “the jury from considering evidence
pertaining to a defendant’s background and character.” In this
case, the California Supreme Court interpreted this holding as
allowing both pre-crime and post-crime mitigation evidence.
The Court believed that, in light of Boyde, this conclusion was
reasonable. 
The Court also believed it was not unreasonable for the state
court to conclude that the “prosecutor’s arguments and remarks
did not mislead the jury into believing it could not consider
Payton’s mitigation evidence.” The defense presented “eight
witnesses, spanning two days of testimony” regarding the miti-
gating evidence.  For the jury to conclude that the evidence
didn’t matter would mean they had to “believe that the penalty
phase served virtually no purpose at all.” Further, “the prose-
cutor devoted specific attention to disputing the sincerity of
Payton’s evidence,” thereby drawing focus on the evidence. 
In Gonzalez v. Crosby,7 a 7-2 Court, in a decision delivered
by Justice Scalia, held that a motion filed under Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure Rule 60(b) that challenges a District Court’s
previous ruling on the statute of limitations in the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA) is not a second or successive habeas petition and can
be ruled upon without pre-certification.  The petitioner pled
guilty in a Florida circuit court to robbery with a firearm.  He
did not file an appeal and began serving his 99-year sentence in
1982.  Within one year after AEDPA was enacted, the petitioner
filed two petitions for state post-conviction relief, which were
denied.  He then filed a federal habeas petition.  The District
Court dismissed the action as barred by the one-year statute of
limitations.  It concluded that “the limitations period was not
tolled during the 163-day period while the petitioner’s second
motion for state post-conviction relief was pending” because
“Section 2244(d)(2) tolls the statute of limitations during the
pendency of ‘properly filed’ applications only.” The second peti-
tion, according to the District Court, “was not ‘properly filed’
because it was both untimely and successive.” The Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit “denied a certificate of appeal-
ability (COA).” On November 7, 2000, the Court decided Artuz
v. Bennett,8 in which it held “that an application for state post-
conviction relief can be ‘properly filed’ even if the state courts
dismiss it as procedurally barred.” Approximately nine months
later, the petitioner filed in the District Court a pro se “Motion
to Amend or Alter Judgment,” contending that the District
Court’s time-bar ruling was incorrect under Artuz’s construc-
tion of section 2242(d), and invoking Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 60 (b)(6), which permits a court to relieve a party
from the effect of a final judgment.” The District Court denied
the petition.  The Eleventh Circuit eventually determined that
“the petitioner’s motion – indeed any post-judgment motion
under Rule 60(b)(6) save one alleging fraud on the court . . .
was in substance a second or successive habeas petition.” 
The Court disagreed with the Eleventh Circuit’s categoriza-
tion of the Rule 60(b) motion although it affirmed the dismissal
of the petitioner’s motion. “Rule 60(b) allows a party to seek
relief from a final judgment, and request reopening of his case,
under a limited set of circumstances including fraud, mistake,
and newly discovered evidence.” Rule 60(b)(6), under which
the petitioner moved, “permits reopening when the movant
shows ‘any . . . reason justifying relief from the operation of the
judgment’ other than the more specific circumstances set out in
Rule 60(b)(1)-(5).” AEDPA does not “expressly circumscribe
the operation of Rule 60(b).” In fact, 28 U.S.C. section 2254
states the Rules of Civil Procedure are applicable “‘to the extent
that . . . [they are] not inconsistent with’ applicable federal
statutory provisions and rules.” The initial question the Court
answered was whether a Rule 60(b) motion is a habeas petition
because “section 2254(b) applies only where the court acts
pursuant to a prisoner’s ‘application’ for a writ of habeas cor-
pus.” The Court believed “it is clear that for the purposes of
section 2244(b) an ‘application’ for habeas relief is a filing that
contains one or more ‘claims.’” According the Court, “a ‘claim’
as used in section 2244(b) is an asserted federal basis for relief
from a state court’s judgment of conviction.” It concluded that
“[i]n some instances, a Rule 60(b) motion will contain one or
more ‘claims.’” The Court believed, as did most Courts of
Appeals, that in these instances, “a Rule 60(b) motion, is in
substance a successive habeas petition and should be treated
accordingly.” To hold otherwise would circumvent the require-
ments of AEDPA.  However, the Court believed that “when a
Rule 60(b) motion attacks not the substance of the federal
court’s resolution of a claim on the merits but some defect in
6. 494 U.S. 370 (1990).
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the integrity of the federal habeas proceedings, there is no basis
for contending that the Rule 60(b) motion should be treated
like a habeas corpus application.”  According to the Court,
“[A]llowing the motion to proceed as denominated creates no
inconsistency with the habeas statute or rules.” The Court
believed that the petitioner’s motion fits within this category.
The motion “confines itself not only to the first federal habeas
petition, but to a non-merits aspect of the first federal habeas
proceeding.” 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
In Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales,9 a 7-2 Court, in an opin-
ion written by Justice Scalia, held that an individual does not
have a property interest in having the police enforce a restrain-
ing order even where police have probable cause to believe the
restraining order has been violated.  The respondent in this
case obtained a restraining order against her husband from a
state court in conjunction with divorce proceedings.  On June
22, 1999, the respondent’s husband, in violation of the
restraining order, “took the three daughters while they were
playing outside the family home.” The respondent contacted
the Castle Rock Police Department numerous times during the
evening and into the night but was told that there was nothing
the police could do.  In short, they refused to act.  At 3:20 a.m.,
the “husband arrived at the police station and opened fire with
a semiautomatic handgun.” He was shot and killed by the
police.  “Inside the cab of his pickup truck, they found the
bodies of all three daughters, whom he had already murdered.” 
The respondent brought an action under 42 U.S.C. section
1983, “claiming that the town violated the Due Process Clause
because its police department had ‘an official policy or custom
of failing to respond properly to complaints of restraining
order violations’ and ‘tolerated the non-enforcement of
restraining orders by its police officers.’” The complaint also
alleged “that the town’s actions ‘were taken either willfully,
recklessly or with such gross negligence as to indicate wonton
disregard and deliberate indifference to’ the respondent’s civil
rights.” The District Court dismissed the action pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  The Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed in part, holding that the
respondent had alleged a cognizable procedural due process
claim. 
The Court disagreed.  The Court stated that it “left a simi-
lar question unanswered” in DeShaney v. Winnebago County
Dept. of Social Servs.,10 where it “held that the so-called ‘sub-
stantive’ component of the Due Process Clause does not
require the State to protect the life, liberty, and property of its
citizens against invasion by private actors.” The Court did not
answer whether “child protection statutes gave [him] an ‘enti-
tlement’ to receive protective services in accordance with the
terms of the statute, an entitlement which would enjoy due
process protection.” According to the Court, “[t]he procedural
aspect of the Due Process Clause does not protect everything
that might be described as a ‘benefit’: ‘To have a property inter-
est in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an
abstract need or desire and
‘more than a unilateral expec-
tation of it.’” Instead, “[h]e
must . . . have a legitimate
claim of entitlement to it.”
These entitlements are not
created by the Constitution
but by state law.  The Court
had previously held that a
benefit is not an entitlement
“if government officials may
grant or deny it in their dis-
cretion.” 
The Court believed “[t]he critical language in the restrain-
ing order did not come from any part of the order itself (which
was signed by the state-court trial judge and directed to the
restrained party . . . ), but from the preprinted notice to law-
enforcement personnel that appeared on the back of the
order.” The notice essentially restated the statute “describing
‘peace officers’ duties’ related to the crime of violation of a
restraining order.” The Court believed that the language,
which creates the grounds upon which the respondent’s hus-
band “could be arrested, criminally prosecuted, and held in
contempt,” does not make “enforcement of restraining orders
mandatory.” According to the Court and its precedent, discre-
tion in law enforcement, despite “seemingly mandatory leg-
islative commands,” is “deep-rooted.” Therefore, “a true man-
date of police action would require some stronger indication
from the Colorado Legislature.” The Court also believed that
even if it did find that the statute created an entitlement, “it is
by no means clear that an individual entitlement to enforce-
ment of a restraining order could constitute a ‘property’ inter-
est for purposes of the Due Process Clause.” It did not resem-
ble “any traditional conception of property.” According to the
Court, it differed significantly in the fact that “the alleged
property interest here arises incidentally, not out of some new
species of government benefit or service, but out of a function
that government actors have always performed – to wit, arrest-
ing people who they have probable cause to believe have com-
mitted a criminal offense.”
FIRST AMENDMENT
In Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass’n,11 a 6-3 Court, in an
opinion written by Justice Scalia, held that the promotional
campaign funded by the beef check-off program, as authorized
by the Beef Promotion and Research Act, is government speech
and, therefore, is immune from a First Amendment challenge.
The Beef Promotion and Research Act of 1985 (Beef Act),
“announces a federal policy of promoting the marketing and
consumption of ‘beef and beef products,’ using funds raised by
an assessment on cattle sales and importation.” The Secretary
of Agriculture, following the procedures set forth in the Beef
Act, issued an order for a “$1-per-head assessment (or “check
off”) on all sales or importation of cattle and a comparable
assessment on imported beef products.” The “assessment is to
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be used to fund beef-related
projects, including promo-
tional campaigns, designed
by the Operating Committee
and approved by the
Secretary.” Since May 1988,
“more than $1 billion has
been collected though the
check off . . . and a large
fraction of that sum has been
spent on promotional pro-
jects authorized by the Beef
Act,” for instance, the trade-
marked slogan “Beef. It’s
What’s for Dinner.” The Beef
Board also “funds overseas marketing efforts; market and food
science research . . . and informational campaigns for both con-
sumers and beef producers.” Most promotional messages bear
the attribution “Funded by America’s Beef Producers.” Further,
“[m]ost print and television messages also bear a Beef Board
logo.”
The respondents were two associations and various individ-
uals who pay the check off.  They brought a suit claiming “that
the Board impermissibly used check off funds to send commu-
nications supportive of the beef program to beef producers.”
While the litigation was pending, the Court decided United
States v. United Foods, Inc.,12 in which the Court held that “a
mandatory check off for generic mushroom advertising vio-
lated the First Amendment.” Because the mushroom check-off
program bore a resemblance to the beef check-off program, the
respondents amended their complaint to allege a First
Amendment violation.
Following a discussion of its First Amendment jurispru-
dence, the Court concluded: (1) “[i]n all of the cases invalidat-
ing exactions to subsidize speech, the speech was, or was pre-
sumed to be, that of an entity other than the government
itself;” (2) its “compelled-subsidy cases have consistently
respected the principle that ‘compelled support of a private
association is fundamentally different from compelled support
of government;’” (3) “‘[c]ompelled support of government’ . . .
is of course perfectly constitutional;” and (4) “some govern-
ment programs involve, or entirely consist of, advocating a
position.” The Court had “generally assumed . . . that com-
pelled funding of government speech does not alone raise First
Amendment concerns.” The respondents did not dispute the
conclusions drawn by the Court, but instead contended that
the promotional campaigns funded by the check-off program
“differ dispositively from the type of government speech that,
our cases suggest, is not susceptible to First Amendment chal-
lenge.” The respondents relied on two points for their argu-
ment: (1) private entities and individuals are the ones who
design the promotional campaign; and (2) “the use of manda-
tory assessment on beef producers to fund the advertising.”
The Court dismissed these arguments.  First, it concluded that
“[t]he message of the promotional campaigns is effectively con-
trolled by the Federal Government itself.” Second, the Court
found it irrelevant that the speech is “funded by a targeted
assessment . . . rather than by general revenues.” The Court
believed “[t]he First Amendment does not confer a right to pay
one’s taxes into the general fund, because the injury of com-
pelled funding (as opposed to the injury of compelled speech)
does not stem from the Government’s mode of accounting.”
Justice Souter, joined by Justices Stevens and Kennedy, dis-
sented.  He stated that the Court “unwisely” accepts the
Government’s defense that “the beef advertising is its own
speech, exempting it from the First Amendment bar against
extracting special subsidies from those unwilling to underwrite
an objectionable message.” He wrote: “The error is not that gov-
ernment speech can never justify compelling a subsidy, but that
a compelled subsidy should not be justifiable by speech unless
the government must put that speech forward as its own.”
Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of a 6-3 Court in
Clingman v. Beaver,13 except in II-A of the opinion, where he
wrote only for the plurality.  The Court held the First
Amendment does not prevent a state from declining to allow
voters who are registered in a certain party to vote in the pri-
maries of another party.  “Oklahoma’s election laws provide
that only registered members of a political party may vote in
the party’s primary . . . unless the party opens its primary to reg-
istered Independents as well.” In May 2000, the Libertarian
Party of Oklahoma (LPO) informed the State Election Board
that it was opening its primaries to all voters.  The Board agreed
as to all voters registered as Independent, but not voters regis-
tered with other parties.  “The LPO and several Republican and
Democratic voters then sued for declaratory and injunctive
relief in the United States District Court for the Western
District of Oklahoma, alleging that Oklahoma’s semi-closed
primary law unconstitutionally burdens their First Amendment
right to freedom of political association.” After a trial, “the dis-
trict court found that Oklahoma’s semi-closed primary system
did not severely burden the respondents’ associational rights.”
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed.  It con-
cluded that “the State’s semi-closed primary statute imposed a
severe burden on the respondents’ associational rights, and
thus was constitutional only if the statute was narrowly tailored
to serve a compelling state interest.” The Tenth Circuit did not
find any of the State’s interests compelling.  
The Court disagreed with the Court of Appeals.  “The
Constitution grants states broad power to prescribe the ‘time,
places, and manner of holding elections for senators and repre-
sentatives,’ . . . which power is matched by state control over
the election process for state offices.” While regulations that
impose severe burdens on associational rights must be nar-
rowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest, if a regula-
tion only imposes a “lesser burden,” a state’s important regula-
tory interests will usually be enough to justify reasonable,
nondiscriminatory restrictions.  In Tashjian v. Republican Party
of Connecticut,14 the Court struck down a closed primary sys-
tem that prevented a political party from inviting Independent
voters to vote in the party’s primary as inconsistent with the
14. 479 U.S. 208 (1986).12. 533 U.S. 405 (2001).
13. 544 U.S. 581 (2005).
The Court held the
First Amendment
does not prevent a
state from declining
to allow voters 
who are registered
in a certain party 
to vote in the 
primaries of
another party.
Court Review 19
First Amendment.  This case asked the question left open in
Tashjian: “whether a State may prevent a political party from
inviting registered voters of other parties to vote in its primary.”
The Court thought the burdens in Clingman were dissimilar
to those in Tashjian.  In Tashjian, the Court identified two ways
in which Connecticut’s closed primary limited its citizens’ free-
dom of political association.  First, it required Independent vot-
ers to affiliate publicly with a party to vote in its primary.  In
Clingman, however, the voters “have already affiliated publicly
with one of Oklahoma’s political parties.” Second, under
Connecticut law, political parties could not “broaden opportu-
nities for joining . . . by their own act, without any intervening
action by potential voters.” The Court saw a similar burden
under Oklahoma’s law, but stated that burden should not be
considered “severe” by itself: “Many electoral regulations,
including voter registration, generally require that voters take
some action to participate in the primary process.” The Court
concluded that these minor barriers between voter and party
“do not compel strict scrutiny.” According to the Court, to deem
ordinary and widespread burdens like these severe “would sub-
ject virtually every electoral regulation to strict scrutiny, hamper
the ability of States to run efficient and equitable elections, and
compel federal courts to rewrite state electoral codes.” Instead
of commanding strict scrutiny when a state electoral provision
places no heavy burden on associational rights, “a State’s impor-
tant regulatory interests will usually be enough to justify rea-
sonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions.” In this case,
Oklahoma had numerous interests that the Court recognized as
important: “It preserves [political] parties as viable identifiable
interest groups, . . . enhances parties’ electioneering and party-
building efforts . . . and guards against party raiding and ‘sore
loser’ candidacies by spurned primary contenders.”
In Tory v. Cochran,15 a 7-2 Court held that since the primary
purpose of the injunction was invalidated by Johnnie Cochran’s
death but the injunction was still valid under California law, it
became an unacceptable prior restraint on Ulysses Tory’s speech.
Cochran brought a successful state defamation suit against Tory
and his associates.  When it became apparent to the state trial
court that Tory would continue to engage in the defamatory
behavior in order to “coerce” Cochran into paying “amounts of
money to which Tory was not entitled,” the court issued a per-
manent injunction, which, among other things, prohibited Tory,
his associates, and their agents or representatives from picket-
ing, displaying signs, placards, or other written or printed mate-
rial, and from orally uttering statements about Johnnie L.
Cochran, Jr., and about Cochran’s law firm in “any public
forum.” Tory appealed and the decision was affirmed.  The
Court granted a writ of certiorari to answer the following ques-
tion: “[w]hether a permanent injunction as a remedy in a
defamation action, preventing all future speech about an admit-
ted public figure, violated the First Amendment.”  However,
after oral argument, the Court was informed that Cochran was
deceased.  Tory agreed to the substitution of Cochran’s widow as
plaintiff.  Cochran’s counsel argued that the case was moot;
however, Tory argued that it was not.
The Court stated that
California law “does not
recognize a cause of action
for an injury to the memory
of a deceased person’s repu-
tation” However, neither
the Court or counsel for
either party discovered any
case law that suggested that
the injunction became
automatically invalid at
Cochran’s death, “not even
the portion personal to
Cochran.” However, the
Court recognized that at
the same time that
Cochran’s death made it unnecessary for them to explore the
petitioners’ basic claims because, “as written, [the injunction]
has now lost its underlying rationale.” The activities forbidden
by the injunction can not longer coerce Cochran to pay “trib-
ute” to Tory for desisting in those activities.  The Court con-
cluded, stating “Consequently, the injunction, as written, now
amounts to an overly broad prior restraint upon speech, lack-
ing plausible justification.”
In Cutter v. Wilkinson,16 the Court interpreted the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA),
which “is the latest of long-running congressional efforts to
accord religious exercise heightened protection from govern-
ment-imposed burdens, consistent with this Court’s prece-
dent.” Enacted under the Spending and Commerce Clauses,
RLUIPA targets two areas, land use and the religious exercises
of institutionalized persons.  Section 3 of RLUIPA, which
relates to institutionalized persons, was at issue in this case.
Section 3 provided that no state or local government shall
impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a per-
son residing in or confined to an institution, unless the gov-
ernment shows that the burden furthers a compelling govern-
ment interest and does so by the least restrictive means.  The
petitioners were current and former inmates of institutions
operated by the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and
Correction, who practice “non-mainstream” religions, includ-
ing Satanist, Wicca, Asatru, and the Church of Jesus Christ
Christian.  They asserted claims under the First and Fourteenth
Amendment and, after the enactment of RLUIPA, Section 3.
The respondents moved to dismiss on the grounds that RLUIPA
violates the Establishment Clause.  Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. sec-
tion 2403(a), the United States intervened in the District Court
to defend RLUIPA’s constitutionality.
A unanimous Court, led by Justice Ginsburg, held that
Congress did not violate the Establishment Clause when it
enacted legislation that forbids a state from interfering with insti-
tutionalized persons’ rights to freely exercise their religion.
Under the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: “Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or pro-
hibiting the free exercise thereof.”  In between the Establishment
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Congress did not
violate the
Establishment Clause
when it enacted 
legislation that 
forbids a state from
interfering with
institutionalized 
persons’ rights to
freely exercise their
religion.
17. 125 S.Ct. 2722 (2005).
18. 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
Clause and the Free Exercise
Clause “there is room for play
. . . some space for legislative
action neither compelled by
the Free Exercise Clause nor
prohibited by the
Establishment Clause.” The
Court determined that
RLUIPA falls within this
space: “On its face, the Act
qualifies as a permissible leg-
islative accommodation of
religion that is not barred by
the Establishment Clause.”
First, it found RLUIPA com-
patible with the Establishment Clause “because it alleviates
exceptional government-created burdens on private religious
exercise.” Second, the Act contains no provisions that make it
incompatible with the Court’s prior decisions: (1) “[p]roperly
applying RLUIPA, courts must take adequate account of the bur-
dens a requested accommodation may impose on non-beneficia-
ries;” and (2) “they must be satisfied that the Act’s prescriptions
are and will be administered neutrally among different faiths.”
According to the Court, RLUIPA only covers those persons
“who are unable freely to attend to their religious needs and are
therefore dependent on the government’s permission and
accommodation for exercise of their religion.”
In McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties Union of
Kentucky,17 a 5-4 Court held that the Establishment Clause
required the removal of the Ten Commandments from the
county’s courthouses because the county’s real purpose, as evi-
denced from the history of its legislation, is based on religion,
despite a pretextual secular purpose.   Justice Souter delivered
the opinion of the Court.  Justice Scalia filed a dissent and was
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas and
Justice Kennedy in part.
In 1999, the petitioners McCreary County and Pulaski
County, Kentucky, displayed in their respective courthouses
large, gold-framed copies of an abridged text of the King James
version of the Ten Commandments, including a citation to the
Book of Exodus.  In McCreary County, the display was in
response to an order of the county legislative body requiring
the display to be posted in “a very high traffic area” of the 
courthouse.  In Pulaski County, the Commandments were
hung because they were “good rules to live by.”  The ACLU
brought an action under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 and sought a
preliminary injunction claiming that the display violated the
“prohibition of religious establishment included in the First
Amendment.”  During the course of the litigation, the counties
changed their displays.  At first, both counties’ legislative bod-
ies authorized by nearly identical resolutions a second,
expanded display reciting that the Ten Commandments are
“the precedent legal code upon which the civil and criminal
codes of . . . Kentucky are founded” and stating several
grounds for taking that position.  When the district court
expanded its preliminary injunction to include the expanded
displays, the counties installed another display in the each
courthouse called, “The Foundations of American Law and
Government Display.” The counties argued that the display
desired to demonstrate that the “Ten Commandments were
part of the foundation of American Law and Government” and
“to educate the citizens of the county regarding some of the
documents that played a significant role in the foundation of
our system of law and government.”
In Stone v. Graham,18 the Court held that the display of the
Commandments in Kentucky’s public schools violated the
First Amendment’s bar against establishment of religion
because their display was for a “predominantly religious pur-
pose . . . given their prominence as an ‘instrument of religion.’”
The Court stated that the counties asked for a different con-
clusion here based on two arguments: (1) “that [the] official
purpose is unknowable and the search for it inherently vain;”
or, alternatively, (2) that the scope of the purpose enquiry
should be limited “so severely that any trivial rationalization
would suffice, under a standard oblivious to the history of reli-
gious government action like the progression of exhibits in this
case.” The Court stated that “[t]he touchstone for our analysis
is the principle that the First Amendment mandates govern-
mental neutrality between religion and religion, and between
religion and non-religion.” The Court viewed the counties’
requests as one to “abandon”  the purpose test set forth in
under Lemon v. Kurtzman. 19 It stated that “[e]xamination of
purpose is a staple of statutory interpretation that makes up
the daily fare of every appellate court in the country.” It also
made practical sense, “as in an Establishment analysis, where
an understanding of official objective emerges from readily dis-
coverable fact, without any judicial psychoanalysis of a
drafter’s heart of hearts.”  The Court stated: “Lemon said that
government action must have a secular . . . purpose . . . and
after a host of cases it is fair to add that although a legislature’s
stated reasons will generally get deference, the secular purpose
required has to be genuine, not a sham, and not merely sec-
ondary to a religious objective.” The Court continued to
quickly dispatch the counties’ argument “that purpose in a
case like this one should be inferred, if at all, only from the lat-
est news about the last in a series of governmental actions,
however close they may all be in time and subject.” The Court
responded by stating: “But the world is not made brand new
every morning, and the counties are simply asking us to ignore
perfectly probative evidence; they want an absentminded
objective observer, not one presumed to be familiar with the
history of the government’s actions and competent to learn
what history has to show.” 
The Court saw two similarities between Stone and this case:
(1) “both set out a text of the Commandments as distinct from
any traditionally symbolic representations;” and (2) “each
stood along, not part of an arguably secular display.” The Court
stated: “Stone stressed the significance of integrating the
Commandments into a secular scheme to forestall the broad-
cast of an otherwise clearly religious message . . . and for good
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reason, the Commandments being a central point of reference
in the religious and moral history of Jews and Christians.”
According to the Court, the counties’ displays “unstinting
focus was on religious passages, showing that the counties
were posting the Commandments precisely because of their
sectarian content.” Further, even their third displays, despite
the nonreligious names, enhanced the sectarian spirit.  The
Court concluded that “[i]f the observer had not thrown up his
hands, he would probably suspect that the counties were sim-
ply reaching for any way to keep religious documents on the
walls of courthouses constitutionally required to embody reli-
gious neutrality.” 
Justice Scalia dissented on the grounds that: (1) the Court
is incorrect in reading the First Amendment as barring the gov-
ernment from favoring religious practice; (2) “today’s opinion
extends the scope of that falsehood even beyond prior cases;”
and (3) “even on the basis of the Court’s false assumptions the
judgment here is wrong.” Justice Scalia looked at the history of
the United States, including recent episodes, to show how the
idea of monotheism is ingrained in our government.  He
argued that the Court’s decision expanded Lemon because “the
Court justifies inquiry into legislative purpose, not as an end
itself, but as a means to ascertain the appearance of the gov-
ernment action to an ‘objective observer.’”
In Van Orden v. Perry,20 the Court held the First Amendment
does not bar the display of the Ten Commandments on a 
monument donated by a special interest group when the State’s
reasons for accepting the monument were purely secular.
Chief Justice Rehnquist announced the judgment of the Court
and was joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas.
Justices Scalia and Thomas also filed concurring opinions.
Justice Breyer filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Souter
filed dissenting opinions.
The 22 acres that comprise the Texas State Capitol are dot-
ted with monuments and historical markers.  One monolith
displays the text of the Ten Commandments, along with other
religious symbols and symbols of the United States.  The mon-
ument, as inscribed, was “PRESENTED TO THE PEOPLE AND
YOUTH OF TEXAS BY THE FRATERNAL ORDER OF EAGLES
OF TEXAS 1961.” The petitioner Thomas Van Orden, a native
Texan, brought an action under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, “seek-
ing both a declaration that the monument’s placement violates
the Establishment Clause and an injunction requiring its
removal.”  The district court held that the monument did not
contravene the Establishment Clause.  It determined that the
State had a valid secular purpose in recognizing and commend-
ing the Eagles for their efforts to reduce juvenile delinquency
and “a reasonable observer, mindful of the history, purpose, and
context, would not conclude that this passive monument con-
veyed the message that the State was seeking to endorse reli-
gion.”  The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. 
The Court agreed.  The plurality believed that the Court’s
precedent relating to the Establishment Clause point in two
directions: (1) “[o]ne face looks toward the strong role played
by religion and religious tra-
ditions throughout our
Nation’s history;” and (2)
the “other face looks toward
the principle that govern-
mental intervention in reli-
gious matters can itself
endanger religious free-
dom.”  These two faces were
evidenced in the Court’s
cases invalidating laws
under the Establishment
Clause.  The Court had
pointed often to Lemon as
providing the governing test
in Establishment Clause
cases.  However, just two
years after Lemon was decided, the Court noted that the factors
identified in Lemon serve as “no more than helpful signposts.”
Many recent cases have either not applied the Lemon test or
“applied it only after concluding that the challenged practice
was invalid under a different Establishment Clause test.”
Regardless, the plurality did not think the Lemon test is “use-
ful in dealing with the sort of passive monument that Texas has
erected on its Capitol grounds” and believed, “[i]nstead, our
analysis is driven both by the nature of the monument and our
Nation’s history.” The plurality first looked at Lynch v.
Donnelly,21 where the Court recognized that “[t]here is an
unbroken history of official acknowledgment by all three
branches of government of the role of religion in American life
from at least 1789.”  In the end, the plurality believed that
Texas’s monument is merely an “acknowledgment of the role
played by the Ten Commandments in our Nation’s heritage.”
Similar displays are common throughout America, even in the
Supreme Court.  They did not dispute that the
Commandments are religious in nature.  However, “[s]imply
having religious content or promoting a message consistent
with a religious doctrine does not run afoul of the
Establishment Clause.” The plurality recognized that there are
limits “to the display of religious messages or symbols.” It
referred to Stone v. Graham,22 where it found that a Kentucky
statute requiring the display of the Commandments in every
classroom had a religious purpose and was, therefore, uncon-
stitutional.  However, the monument in Texas “is a far more
passive use of those texts than was the case in Stone, where the
text confronted elementary school students every day.” 
Justice Scalia wrote a concurring opinion because he would
prefer a holding that “is in accord with our Nation’s past and
present practices, and that can be consistently applied – the
central relevant feature of which is that there is nothing uncon-
stitutional in a State’s favoring religion generally, honoring God
. . . or, in a non-proselytizing manner, venerating the Ten
Commandments.”  Justice Thomas, also concurring, wrote
because he also believed the Court should return to the origi-
nal meaning of the word “establishment.” According to Justice
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Thomas, “[t]he Framers
understood establishment
necessarily [to] involve actual
legal coercion.” Justice Breyer
concurs in the judgment.  He
believed that the Religious
Clauses of the First
Amendment “seek to main-
tain that separation of church
and state that has long been
critical to the peaceful domin-
ion that religion exercises in
[this] country, where the
spirit of religion and the spirit of freedom are productively
united, reigning together, but in separate spheres.”  In deter-
mining Texas’s monument constitutional, he relied less “on a
literal application of any particular test,” i.e., Lemon, “than
upon consideration of the basic purposes of the First
Amendment’s Religion Clauses themselves.”  He believed that
in certain contexts, the text of the Commandments does not
convey a religious message but possibly a moral secular mes-
sage or a historical message – “a fact that helps to explain the
display of those tablets in dozens of courthouses throughout
the Nation, including the Supreme Court of the United States.” 
Justices Stevens, O’Connor, and Souter dissented.  Justice
Stevens believed that the monument “is not a work of art and
does not refer to any event in the history of the State,” but
clearly just communicates a religious message.  He believed
“[t]he monolith displayed on Texas Capitol grounds cannot be
discounted as a passive acknowledgment of religion, nor can
the State’s refusal to remove it upon objection be explained as
a simple desire to preserve a historic relic.” The Nation’s com-
mitment to neutrality, as reflected in the Religious Clauses, “is
flatly inconsistent with the plurality’s wholehearted validation
of an official state endorsement of the message that there is
one, and only one, God.” Justice Souter, also dissenting, wrote
because he believed that the Court’s prior cases had made clear
that the simple reality was “that the Ten Commandments con-
stitute a religious statement, that their message is inherently
religious, and that the purpose of singling them out in a dis-
play is clearly the same.”
FEDERALISM
In Gonzales v. Raich,23 the Court considered California’s
Compassionate Use Act of 1996 (Act), which “creates an
exemption from criminal prosecution for physicians, as well as
for patients and primary caregivers who possess or cultivate
marijuana for medicinal purposes with the recommendation or
approval of a physician.” California was only one of nine States
that has legalized the use of marijuana for medicinal purposes.
The purpose of the Act “was . . . to ensure that seriously ill res-
idents of the State have access to marijuana for medical pur-
poses, and to encourage Federal and State Governments to
take steps towards ensuring the safe and affordable distribu-
tion of the drug to patients in need.” The respondents are
California residents who suffer from various medical condi-
tions, as well as primary caregivers who have sought to avail
themselves of medical marijuana pursuant to the terms of the
Act.  The respondents filed this action against the United States
Attorney General and the head of the DEA, “seeking injunctive
and declaratory relief prohibiting the enforcement of the fed-
eral Controlled Substances Act (CSA). . . to the extent it pre-
vents them from possessing, obtaining, or manufacturing
cannabis for their personal medical use.” Their claims are
based on the Commerce Clause, the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment, the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, and the
doctrine of medical necessity.
In a 6-3 decision, with Justice Stevens writing for the major-
ity, the Court held that Congress has the power under the
Commerce Clause to regulate even the local cultivation and
use of marijuana for medical purposes.  The Court began its
opinion with a lengthy discussion of the history of the CSA.
Its main objective was “to conquer drug abuse and to control
the legitimate and illegitimate traffic in controlled substances.”
In particular, Congress sought to control “the diversion of
drugs from legitimate to illicit channels.” Therefore, Congress
enacted a “closed regulatory system making it unlawful to
manufacture, distribute, dispense, or possess any controlled
substance except in a manner authorized by the CSA.”
Marijuana was and is classified as a Schedule I drug, which are
drugs that have a “high potential for abuse, lack of any
accepted medical use, and [the] absence of any accepted safety
for use in medically supervised treatment.” 
The respondents did not challenge the validity of the CSA
but instead argued that “the CSA’s categorical prohibition of
the manufacture and possession of marijuana as applied to the
intrastate manufacture and possession of marijuana for 
medical purposes pursuant to California law exceeds
Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause.” The Court
stated that to determine the validity of the CSA in these cir-
cumstances, “none of our Commerce Clause cases can be
viewed in isolation,” primarily because the Court’s under-
standing of Congress’s power “has evolved over time.” Initially,
“the primary use of the Clause was to preclude the kind of dis-
criminatory state legislation that had once been permissible.”
Then, “Congress ‘ushered in a new era of federal regulation.’”
During the new era, the Court has “identified three general cat-
egories of regulation in which Congress is authorized to
engage under its commerce power:” (1) “Congress can regulate
the channels of interstate commerce;” (2) “Congress has
authority to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of inter-
state commerce, and person or things in interstate commerce;”
and (3) “Congress has the power to regulate activities that sub-
stantially affect interstate commerce.” The Court’s case law had
made clear that Congress can “regulate purely local activities
that are part of an economic ‘class of activities’ that have a sub-
stantial effect on interstate commerce.” 
The Court focused on one of its prior cases as instructive of
the principles set forth above: Wickard v. Fulburn.24 In that
case, Congress had enacted a statute designed to “control the
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volume of wheat moving in interstate and foreign commerce in
order to avoid surpluses and consequent abnormally low
prices.” Fulburn was only allowed 11.1 acres for his wheat
crop but cultivated 23, claiming that the surplus was for use
only on his farm.  The Court determined that Fulburn’s culti-
vation of wheat for personal use was still within Congress’s
power to regulate.  The Court believed the similarities between
these cases were “striking:” “The respondents are cultivating,
for home consumption, a fungible commodity for which there
is an established, albeit illegal, interstate market.” Like the
agricultural law in Wickard, the CSA’s purpose was “to control
the supply and demand of controlled substances in both law-
ful and unlawful drug markets.” As above, “[h]ere too,
Congress had a rational basis for concluding that leaving
home-consumed marijuana outside federal control would sim-
ilarly affect price and market conditions.” Further, Congress
was right to be concerned that the demand for marijuana in the
interstate market will “draw such marijuana into that market.”
The Court reasoned that “One need not have a degree in eco-
nomics to understand why a nationwide exemption for the
vast quantity of marijuana (or other drugs) locally cultivated
for personal use (which presumably would include use by
friends, neighbors, and family members) may have a substan-
tial impact on the interstate market for this extraordinarily
popular substance.” 
Justice O’Connor, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice
Thomas in part, dissented.  She believed the Court’s decision
was incongruous with its prior holdings and “gives Congress a
perverse incentive to legislate broadly pursuant to the
Commerce Clause.” She called California’s law an “experi-
ment” that should be protected “to maintain the distribution of
power fundamental to our federalist system of government.”
Justice Thomas also wrote separately.  He believed the respon-
dents’ use of marijuana “has had no demonstrable effect on the
national market for marijuana.” Under the Court’s rule,
Congress will be able to regulate “anything – and the Federal
Government is no longer one of limited and enumerated pow-
ers.” He also rejected the Court’s argument that banning the
medical use of marijuana is necessary and proper to carry out
Congress’s goals as set forth by CSA.
In Granholm v. Heald,25 a 5-4 Court, in a decision written by
Justice Kennedy, held that state laws that discriminate against
out-of-state wineries violate the Commerce Clause; they are
not saved by the Twenty-first Amendment even though it
grants the States the broad power to regulate the transportation
and importation of alcoholic beverages.  Both Michigan and
New York have laws which regulate the sale and importation of
alcoholic beverages through a three-tier distribution system,
meaning “[s]eparate licenses are required for producers,
wholesalers, and retailers.” The Court has previously upheld
“three-tier distribution scheme in the exercise of . . . [the
States’] authority under the Twenty-first Amendment.”
However, the Michigan and New York laws are before the
Court because they apply only to out-of-state wineries.  In
Michigan, in-state wineries “are eligible for ‘wine maker’
licenses that allow direct
shipment to in-state con-
sumers,” while out-of-state
wineries are not.  In New
York, in-state wineries can
make “direct sales to con-
sumers in New York on terms
not available to out-of-state
wineries.” Many small winer-
ies “rely on direct shipping to
reach new markets” because
they do not produce enough
product for wholesalers to
purchase it.  This case, based on a claim that the states violat-
ing the Commerce Clause, was filed by wine producers of
small wineries “that rely on direct consumer sales as an impor-
tant part of their business.”
The Court began its opinion by stating: “Time and again
this Court has held that, in all but the narrowest circum-
stances, state laws violate the Commerce Clause if they man-
date ‘differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state eco-
nomic interests that benefits the former and burdens the lat-
ter.’”  This rule “follows . . . from the principle that states
should not be compelled to negotiate with each other regard-
ing favored or disfavored status for their own citizens” because
they “deprive citizens of their right to have access to the mar-
kets of other states on equal terms.”  The Court found that the
“discriminatory character of the Michigan system is obvious.”
While in-state wineries can obtain licenses to ship directly to
consumers, out-of-state wineries cannot.  Although the New
York law is different, the Court found it also discriminates.  It
found the law “is just an indirect way of subjecting out-of-state
wineries, but not local ones, to the three-tier system” and
“grants in-state wineries access to the State’s consumers on
preferential terms.” 
The states “contend that their statutes are saved by section 2
of the Twenty-first Amendment, which provides:” “The trans-
portation of importation into any State, Territory, or possession
of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating
liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.”
The ratification of the Twenty-first Amendment in 1933 ended
nationwide prohibition by repealing the Eighteenth
Amendment.  Its aim was “to allow states to maintain an effec-
tive and uniform system for controlling liquor by regulating its
transportation, importation, and use.” The Court stated that its
“more recent cases . . . confirm that the Twenty-first
Amendment does not supersede other provisions of the
Constitution and, in particular, does not displace the rule that
states may not give a discriminatory preference to their own
producers.” Since the Court did not find that either State’s
regime “advances a legitimate local purpose that cannot be ade-
quately served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives,” it
found that both run afoul of the Commerce Clause.  
In American Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. Michigan Pub. Serv.
Comm’n,26 the Court held that Michigan’s law that imposed a
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$100 fee on motor carriers
engaging in intrastate com-
merce does not violate the
Commerce Clause.  A subsec-
tion of Michigan’s Motor
Carrier Act imposed upon
each motor carrier for the
administration of this act, an
annual fee of $100 for each
self-propelled motor vehicle
operated by or on behalf of
the motor carrier.  The fee
was assessed only on motor
carriers that operate in intrastate commerce.  The petitioners
operated both interstate and intrastate commerce and both
claimed “that trucks that carry both interstate and intrastate
loads engage in intrastate business less than trucks that confine
their operations to the Great Lakes State.” They argued that,
“because Michigan’s fee was flat, it discriminates again inter-
state carriers and imposes unconstitutional burdens upon
interstate trade.”
The Court began its opinion by stating: “Our Constitution
‘was framed upon the theory that the peoples of the several
states must sink or swim together.’” Therefore, “this Court has
consistently held that the Constitution’s express grant to
Congress of the power to ‘regulate Commerce . . . among the
several States, contains a further, negative command, known as
the dormant Commerce Clause.’” The dormant Commerce
Clause “‘create[s] an area free from interference by the States’” 
. . . and prevents them ‘jeopardizing the welfare of the Nation as
a whole’ by ‘plac[ing] burdens on the flow of commerce across
its borders that commerce wholly within those borders would
not bear.’” Under the dormant Commerce Clause, the Court has
invalidated a number of state laws in the following areas: (1)
laws that “discriminate on their face against out-of-state enti-
ties;” (2) laws that “impose burdens on interstate trade that are
clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits;” (3)
laws that “impose taxes that facially discriminate against inter-
state business and offer commercial advantage to local enter-
prises;” (4) laws that “improperly apportion state assessments
on transactions with out-of-state components;” and (5) laws
that “have the inevitable effect [of] threatening the free move-
ment of commerce by placing a financial barrier around the
State.” The Court found that “[a]pplying these principles and
precedents,” nothing in Michigan’s law offended the Commerce
Clause.  Michigan only imposed a flat fee of $100 on trucks that
operate within intrastate commerce.  This law does not discrim-
inate against out-of-state operators, “does not reflect an effort to
tax activity that takes place . . . outside the State,” and “[n]oth-
ing in our case law suggests that such a neutral, locally focused
fee or tax is inconsistent with the dormant Commerce Clause.” 
Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment but would rest his
decision “without adverting to various tests from our wardrobe
of ever-changing negative Commerce Clause fashions.” Instead
he would “ask whether the fee ‘facially discriminates against
interstate commerce’ and whether it was ‘indistinguishable
from a type of law previously held unconstitutional by this
Court.’” Justice Thomas also concurred in the judgment but
because “’the negative Commerce Clause has no basis in the
text of the Constitution, makes little sense, and has proved vir-
tually unworkable in application.’” 
Federal law required a Federal Permit for all motor carriers
operating in interstate commerce.  Michigan has a state law,
which provided: “A motor carrier licensed in this state shall pay
an annual fee of $100.00 for each vehicle operated by the motor
carrier which is registered in this state [i.e., which has a
Michigan license plate] and operating entirely in interstate
commerce.” In Mid-Con Freight Systems, Inc. v. Michigan Public
Serv. Comm’n,27 the Court considered whether the federal
Single State Registration System (SSRS) preempted this state
law.  “The SSRS allows a trucking company to fill out one set of
forms in one State (the base State), and by doing so to register
its Federal Permit in every State through which its trucks will
travel.” The SSRS allows the State to demand the following:
“(1) proof of the trucking company’s possession of a Federal
Permit, (2) proof of insurance, (3) the name of an agent desig-
nated to receive ‘service of process,’ and (4) a total fee (charged
for the filing of the proof of insurance) equal to the sum of the
individual state fees.” In addition, “[t]he SSRS statute specifies
that a State may not impose any additional ‘registration require-
ment’” and provides, specifically, that “when a State
Registration requirement imposes further obligations, ‘the part
in excess is an unreasonable burden.’” 
In a 6-3 decision, the Court held that the SSRS does not pre-
empt Michigan’s $100 fee because the latter relates to matters
that fall outside the scope of the SSRS.  The first question the
Court addressed was what SSRS means when it uses the term
“State registration requirement.” The Court concluded that the
interpretation was very narrow: they “apply only to those state
requirements that concern SSRS registration – that is, registra-
tion with a State of evidence that a carrier possesses a Federal
Permit, registration of proof of insurance, or registration of the
name of an agent ‘for service of process.’” The Court believed
that the language of the statute “makes clear that the federal
provision reaches no further.” The Court also believed that
Michigan’s statute does not concern SSRS’s subject matter.
First, “the Michigan statute imposing the $100 fee makes no
reference to evidence of a Federal Permit, to any insurance
requirement, or to an agent for receiving service of process.”
Second, legislative history shows the law was not established to
circumvent the federal statute.  Finally, “Michigan rules provide
that a Michigan-plated interstate truck choosing Michigan as
its SSRS base State can apparently comply with Michigan’s SSRS
requirements even if it does not comply with Michigan’s $100
fee requirement.” The truck owner could simply fill out a dif-
ferent form providing proof of a Federal Permit and another
form to comply with Michigan and SSRS’s requirements.  They
would not receive a state decal, but “nothing . . . suggests the
owner will have violated any other provision of Michigan law 
. . . [a]nd they have not demonstrated that Michigan law in
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practice holds hostage a truck owner’s SSRS compliance until
the owner pays” the $100 fee. 
IMMIGRATION
Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion for a unani-
mous Court in Leocal v. Ashcroft.28 It held that a conviction
under a statute for driving under the influence, which does not
have a mens rea component, is not a crime of violence under 18
U.S.C. section 16, requiring deportation. The petitioner immi-
grated to the United States and became a lawful permanent 
resident. Subsequently, the petitioner was charged under
Florida law and pleaded guilty to two counts of driving under
the influence of alcohol (DUI), causing seriously bodily injury.
He was sentenced to two and a half years in prison. While serv-
ing his sentence, the Immigration and Nationalization Service
(INS) initiated removal proceedings under section 237 of the
Immigration and Nationalization Act (INA). Section 237 allows
the Attorney General to order removal of an alien “who is con-
victed of an aggravated felony.” An “aggravated felony” includes
crimes of violence, as defined by 18 U.S.C. section 16, “for
which the term of imprisonment [is] at least one year.” Section
16 defines “crimes of violence” as follows: (1) crimes in which
there is an element of “use, attempted use, or threatened use of
physical force against the person or property of another;” or (2)
an offense that is a felony that “by its nature, involves a sub-
stantial risk that physical force against the person or property of
another may be used in the course of committing the offense.”
The Immigration Judge determined that the petitioner was
removable. The Board of Immigration Appeals and the Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.  
The Court began by stating that section 16 directs the Court
to look at “the elements and the nature of the offense of con-
viction, rather than to the particular facts relating to the peti-
tioner’s crime.” The crime for which the petitioner was con-
victed is a third-degree felony under Florida law. Although the
statute required proof of causation of injury, it does not require
proof of “any particular mental state.” To qualify as a “crime of
violence” under the first part of section 16, the crime “must
have ‘as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of
physical force against the person or property of another.” The
Court believed that focusing only on the word “use” is too nar-
row. Instead, “when interpreting a statute that features as elas-
tic a word as ‘use,’ we construe language in its context and in
light of the terms surrounding it.” Looking at the phrase as a
whole, the Court concluded that “‘use’ requires active employ-
ment.” The Court believed that this interpretation does not
include the use of force by “accident.” The Court also found
that Florida’s DUI statute does not qualify as a crime of violence
under the second part of the statute. It does not, according to
the Court, include “all negligent misconduct,” but “offenses
that naturally involve a person acting in disregard of the risk
that physical force might be used against another in committing
an offense,” i.e., burglary. The Court concluded that even
though the second part of section 16 is broader, it cannot con-
strue it any more broadly than the first section since “it contains
the same formulation” with
regard to the “use” of physi-
cal force. The Court con-
cluded its opinion by stating
that it “cannot forget that we
ultimately are determining
the meaning of the term
‘crime of violence.’” It stated
that the ordinary use of this
term combined with “section
16’s emphasis on the use of
physical force . . . suggests a
category of violent, active
crimes that cannot be said
naturally to include DUI
offenses.”
In Jama v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement,29 a 5-4
Court, in an opinion written by Justice Scalia, held that the
Attorney General need not obtain the advance consent of the
“additional removal countries” to which an alien may be
removed except in the last instance where, if it is “impractica-
ble, inadvisable, or impossible,” then the Attorney General
may remove an alien to any country that gives its consent. The
petitioner was born in Somalia and remains a citizen of that
country. He was admitted to the United States as a refugee but
his status was terminated in 2000 due to a criminal conviction.
The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) brought a
removal action. The petitioner “declined to designate a coun-
try to which he preferred to be removed.” Therefore, the
Immigration Judge ordered him removed to Somalia. The
Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed and the petitioner did
not seek further review. Instead, the petitioner sought a writ of
habeas corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 2241 “to chal-
lenge the designation of Somalia as his destination.” He
claimed “that Somalia had no functioning government, that
Somalia therefore could not consent in advance to his removal,
and that the Government was barred from removing him to
Somalia absent advance consent.”
The Attorney General determined an alien’s destination
after removal is ordered under 28 U.S.C. section 1231(b)(2).
In sum, the statute provided “four consecutive removal com-
mands:” (1) an alien “shall be removed to the country of his
choice” unless certain conditions exist (hereinafter,
“Subparagraphs A through C”); (2) “otherwise he shall be
removed to the country of which he is a citizen, unless one of
the conditions eliminating that command is satisfied” (here-
inafter, “Subparagraph D”); (3) an alien shall be removed “to
one of the countries with which he has a lesser connection”
(hereinafter, “Subparagraph E, clauses (i) through (vi)”); or
(4), if (3) is “impracticable, inadvisable, or impossible,” then
the alien “shall be removed to ‘another country whose govern-
ment will accept the alien into that country’” (hereinafter,
“Subparagraph E, clause (vii)”). The Court stated that it will
not “lightly assume that Congress has omitted from its adopted
text requirements what it nonetheless intends to apply.” This is
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especially true if “Congress has shown elsewhere in the same
statute that it knows how to make such a requirement mani-
fest.” The Court concluded, therefore, that the statute does not
require by its terms that acceptance by Somalia is necessary:
the requirement that the destination country give approval
applies only to Subparagraph E, clause (vii), not Subparagraph
E, clauses (i) through (vi). The language of the statute is spe-
cific and no mention of approval is made in Subparagraph E
except as it pertains to the terminal clause: “[i]f impracticable,
inadvisable, or impossible to remove the alien to each country
described in a previous clause of this subparagraph, another
country whose government will accept the alien into that
country.” 
In Clark v. Martinez,30 a 7-2 Court, in an opinion written by
Justice Scalia, held that under 8 U.S.C. section 1231(a)(6), an
alien may be detained beyond the 90-day removal period, but
only for as long as is reasonably necessary to effectuate
removal. The respondents arrived in the United States from
Cuba in June 1980 as part of the “Mariel boatlift.” Pursuant to
8 U.S.C. section 1182(d)(5), they were paroled in the country
under the Attorney General’s authority. Until 1996, Cubans
who were paroled into the United Stated could adjust their sta-
tus after one year to that of “permanent lawful resident.”
Martinez and Benitez did not qualify for the adjustment at the
time they applied because of prior criminal convictions in the
United States. After their application, both men were convicted
of additional crimes. In both cases, the INS took the men into
custody and they were ordered removed. Also in both cases,
the men were detained beyond the 90-day removal period as
set forth in section 1216(a)(6). The respondents filed petitions
for writs of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. section 2241 “to
challenge their detention beyond the 90-day removal period.” 
Section 1231(a)(6) provided that three specific categories of
aliens “‘may be detained beyond the removal period and, if
released, shall be subject to the terms of supervision.’” The
three categories of aliens are: (1) “those ordered removed who
are inadmissible under section 1182;” (2) “those ordered
removed who are removable under section 1227(a)(1)(C),
1227(a)(2), or 1227(a)(4);” and (3) “those ordered removed
whom the Secretary determines to be either a risk to the com-
munity or a flight risk.”  With regards to the second category,
the Court, in Zadvydas v. Davis,31 “interpreted this provision to
authorize the Attorney General . . . to detain aliens only as long
as ‘reasonably necessary’ to remove them from the country.”
The Court laid out its reasoning behind this decision: (1) the
word “may” is ambiguous, but suggests discretion; and (2)
there is a “’serious constitutional threat’” of “indefinite deten-
tion.” The question presented in this case is whether this rea-
soning also applied to the first category of aliens in section
1231(a)(6). The Court answers in the affirmative.  The Court
stated that the “operative” language in section 1231(a)(6),
“‘may be detained beyond the removal period,’ applies without
differentiation to all three categories of aliens.” The Court con-
cluded that this “cannot justify giving the same detention pro-
vision a different meaning when such aliens are involved.” The
“lowest common denominator,” or interpretation of the same
ambiguous language, must apply to all three categories of
aliens specified in the statute. 
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It was a great trip to Tijuana.  You got two cases of real vanillafor everyone on your Christmas list, a huge bunch of realMexican oregano, and a three-legged-pig clay sculpture to
finish off your newly renovated Spanish-style living room.
That pig was a great find.  Already it’s bringing you luck; there
is hardly a line to cross back into the States, and at this rate,
you will make it home in time to watch Boston Legal.
Unfortunately, it won’t work out that way.  The border agents
who are randomly pulling cars out of line, send you to the sec-
ondary inspection area.  While you chat with the agent, he
picks up the clay pig, and suddenly, he doesn’t seem friendly
any more.  The dog circling your car has just dipped his head
twice near your trunk, you are getting sweaty, and more agents
seem to be taking an interest in your car.  Before you know
what’s happening, the agent smashes the clay pig to look
inside.  Surely he can’t do that!  Surely this is an unreasonable
search . . . isn’t it?  Unfortunately, it is probably okay.
Recently, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decided the
government can destroy personal property during a search at
the border without restraint or probable cause.1 The Ninth
Circuit’s holding in United States v. Cortez-Rocha2 represents a
dangerous precedent not only for border searches, but for the
reasonableness standard embedded in the Fourth
Amendment.3 However, this power should not eliminate all
Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable
searches.4 Although the federal government may have the abil-
ity to conduct searches without probable cause at the border,
that power does not allow federal agents to destroy personal
property when agents can open a container with minimal dam-
age and when no exigent circumstances exist.5
On February 16, 2003, Julio Cortez-Rocha (Cortez)
attempted to enter the United States from Mexico.6 During the
routine border questioning, customs agents became suspicious
of Cortez and sent him to a secondary inspection area.7 During
the search, the agents slashed open his spare tire, found several
bricks of marijuana, and arrested Cortez.8
The Ninth Circuit determined that a destructive search of
personal property at the border was reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment even though the agents could have disas-
sembled or opened the container without destroying it.9 The
decision in Cortez-Rocha raises troubling questions about citi-
zens’ rights, the status of the Fourth Amendment at the border,
and the applicability of the exclusionary rule to border
searches.    
Constitutional protections are being restricted by the courts
in the name of justice and national security.  Although the gov-
ernment has a reasonable interest in regulating what crosses its
borders, individuals do not lose constitutional protections at the
border, and courts should affirm the substantial protections
against unreasonable searches and seizures.10 The Ninth Circuit
should have encouraged government agents to conduct their
investigations within the boundaries set by United States v.
Flores-Montano,11 rather than further weighting the balancing
test in favor of the government.12 Suppressing the marijuana in
the Cortez-Rocha case would not have prevented agents from
inspecting containers crossing the border.  Rather, the Ninth
Circuit should have held that the destruction of a container,
absent an additional justification, is particularly offensive and
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makes the search unreasonable.13 Instead of determining
whether the trial judge correctly admitted the evidence, the
Ninth Circuit held that the complete destruction of a person’s
property was not offensive, thereby further reducing an individ-
ual’s protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.14
There is no justification for protecting searches that com-
pletely destroy an object, regardless of the object’s value, when
there are nondestructive methods for opening it.15 Agents
have a lower threshold to meet to justify searches at the border
and the scope of those searches is nearly unlimited.  However,
the border search does not eliminate the restraint agents must
use when conducting the search.  Allowing federal customs
agents to destroy personal property when they can open the
container with minimal damage and common tools eliminates
all Fourth Amendment protections at the border.  
I.  CASE DESCRIPTION
Julio Cortez-Rocha (Cortez) attempted to enter the country
through the Calexico Port of Entry between California and
Mexico on February 16, 2003, while smuggling 42 kilograms
of marijuana in his spare tire.16 Border customs agents were
conducting a routine border check of Cortez’s 1979 Chevy
pickup and became suspicious when a drug dog signaled near
the gas tank of Cortez’s truck.17 Agents moved Cortez to a sec-
ondary inspection area, placed him in handcuffs, and con-
ducted a detailed search of his vehicle.18 They placed a density
meter against the spare tire, which registered a high reading.19
The agents put the truck on a hydraulic lift, removed the spare
tire, and slashed it open.20 The agents found 42.22 kilograms
of marijuana and arrested Cortez.21
On February 26, 2003, the government charged Cortez with
one count of importing marijuana and one count of possession
with the intent to distribute.22 Prior to trial, Cortez asserted
that “cutting open the spare tire . . . represented a ‘non-routine’
search that must be justified by reasonable, articulable suspi-
cion.”23 Further, Cortez argued that the government had not
established reasonable suspicion since it provided no evidence
13. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 618 n.13.
14. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 653 (1961); Ker v. California, 374
U.S. 23, 34 (1963) (“[T]here is no formula for . . . reasonableness.
Each case is to be decided on its own facts and circumstances 
. . . .”). 
15. See United States v. Osage, 235 F.3d 518 (10th Cir. 2000).
16. United States v. Cortez-Rocha, 394 F.3d 1115, 1118 (9th Cir.
2005).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. Density busters measure the density of objects.  Id.; Appellant’s
Opening Brief at 4, United States v. Cortez-Rocha. Agents compare
the meter reading to an acceptable range for the object tested.  Id.
If the reading is “high,” the object is denser than normal and sug-
gests a strong probability there is a something hidden within the
object.  Id.
20. Cortez-Rocha, 394 F.3d at 1118.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Appellant’s Opening Brief at 4, United States v. Cortez-Rocha.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 5.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 6.  
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. United States v. Cortez-Rocha, 394 F.3d 1115, 1126 (9th Cir.
2005).
31. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
32. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-39 (1983).  
33. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356-57 (1967) (citations omit-
ted).  
34. Katz, 389 U.S. at 356-57.
35. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961) (quoting Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928)).
36. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487 (1963).
37. E.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (admitting evi-
dence under “good-faith” exception); Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616-
17 (1977) (holding border searches are reasonable by virtue of
their location); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) (holding
a search during a custodial arrest is reasonable to prevent officer
from harm). 
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on the reliability of the dog or
the density buster.24 To sup-
port his suppression motion,
Cortez filed discovery
motions on the reliability of
the dog and density buster.25
The government coun-
tered that the search did not
require reasonable suspicion
since the search was a routine
border search and, therefore,
reasonable.26 Ultimately, the
trial court denied both
motions, determining that since the search was routine it did
not require reasonable suspicion and that the discovery motion
was moot.27 After the trial court denied his motion, Cortez
pleaded guilty to the importation of marijuana charge, condi-
tioned on his appeal of the suppression motion.28 The district
court sentenced Cortez to time served and two years proba-
tion.29 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed Cortez’s convic-
tion.30
II.  BACKGROUND
The Fourth Amendment prevents the government from
conducting unreasonable searches and seizures without proba-
ble cause.31 Probable cause is a reasonable belief that the gov-
ernment will find evidence of a crime in a particular location.32
Typically, searches and seizures require a detached magistrate
to determine whether probable cause exists to support the gov-
ernment’s warrant request.33 If the magistrate finds probable
cause, the magistrate will issue a warrant.34 If the government
conducts a warrantless search, then a defendant may keep the
evidence out of the prosecutor’s case-in-chief presentation
through the exclusionary rule.35 However, several exceptions
to the warrant requirement allow the prosecutor to bring in
evidence obtained outside the warrant process.36 Each excep-
tion defines reasonableness differently.37
There is no 
justification for
protecting searches
that completely
destroy an object 
. . . when there
are nondestructive
methods for 
opening it.
38. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616-17 (1977).  
39. See Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 749-50 (1984) (summariz-
ing several warrant-requirement exceptions).
40. “Interior” refers to searches or seizures within the United States’
borders. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 154.
41. Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 622.  
42. See Carroll, 267 U.S. at 154; United States v. Knight, 534 U.S. 112,
118-119 (2001) (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295,
300 (1999)). 
43. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, § 3.4  (3d ed.
2000). 
44. Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4 (1990).
45. See, e.g., Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149 (border crossings); United
States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985) (airports);
Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (international mail).
46. LAFAVE, supra note 43 at 236.
47. See Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 155; Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 618,
n.13; Appellant’s Opening Brief at 11, United States v. Cortez-
Rocha.
48. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925).
49. 431 U.S. 606, 616-17 (1977).
50. Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 624-25.  Point of entry into the United States
of property or persons is the functional equivalent of the border.
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272-273 (1973).
51. Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 272-273.
52. Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 624-25.
53. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985).
54. 473 U.S. 531 (1985).
55. Balloon swallowers ingest condoms or balloons filled with drugs,
enter the country, and naturally expel the drugs at their destina-
tion.  Id. at 533.
56. Id. Hernandez claimed to be a buyer for a store in Columbia to
account for her frequent trips between Bogotá and Los Angeles.
Id. However, the lack of substantial luggage and hotel plans dis-
counted her story.  Id. 
57. Id. at 534.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 535-36.
60. Id. at 536-38.
61. Id. at 541, 543-44.
62. United States v. Des Jardins, 747 F.2d 499, 504 (1984) (citations
omitted); Henderson v. United States, 390 F.2d 805, 808 (9th Cir.
1967).
63. Id.
A. Border Searches
The United States
Supreme Court has long con-
sidered border searches rea-
sonable without a finding of
probable cause by a detached
magistrate simply “by virtue
of the fact that they occur at
the border . . . .”38 The bor-
der-search reasonableness
definition is not rooted in the
“exigent circumstance”39 analysis used in interior40 Fourth
Amendment analyses.41 Rather, the long-standing exception
for border searches springs from the government’s interest in
regulating what enters the country by securing its borders from
unwanted contraband and preventing illegal immigration.42
Thus, border searches are more of a regulatory search, such as
an inventory search,43 and government agents are restricted in
the manner in which they carry out the search.44 The United
States Supreme Court has reaffirmed the border-search excep-
tion numerous times.45
The border-search exception allows for a search of the entire
vehicle and its containers without obtaining a search warrant
or establishing probable cause.46 However, the individual may
rebut the presumption of validity by showing agents con-
ducted the search in a particularly offensive manner.47 To
determine whether the government has exceeded its authority,
the court must use a balancing test to determine whether
agents conducted the search in a “manner which will conserve
public interests as well as the interests and rights of individual
citizens.”48
For example, in United States v. Ramsey49 the United States
Supreme Court held that an inspection of suspicious letters
was reasonable because the agent conducted the search when
the letters entered the country.50 The agent searched the letters
at the point of entry into the United States for the letters, the
functional equivalent of the border, 51 and the border exception
made the search reasonable.52
Although individuals have greater constitutional protec-
tions than their property, customs agents may still detain indi-
viduals, regardless of where they enter, for a reasonable
amount of time to determine whether they are smuggling con-
traband.53 In United States v. Montoya de Hernandez,54 customs
agents suspected that Rosa Montoya de Hernandez was a “bal-
loon swallower”55 because of the suspicious characteristics of
her story and dress.56 During a pat-down and strip search,
agents noticed Hernandez’s abdomen was firm and that she
was wearing two pairs of elastic underwear.57 Agents gave
Hernandez the option to have an x-ray or wait until she had a
bowel movement so they could determine what was in her
abdomen.58 After 16 hours, agents obtained a court order for
a rectal exam and discovered 88 balloons filled with cocaine.59
Hernandez moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that
the search was unreasonable as it violated her privacy and dig-
nity and that the government did not obtain a warrant until
after she had been detained for 16 hours.60 The United States
Supreme Court considered the detention to be “routine” since
agents confined Hernandez until they could determine
whether she was smuggling drugs.61 Defining the agents’
search of Hernandez as routine would lead courts to extend the
same analysis to property searched at the border.
B. The Ninth Circuit and the Routine/Non-Routine
Analytical Framework
The Ninth Circuit has consistently held that agents must
conduct border searches in a reasonable manner.62 In 1967,
1970, and 1984, the court held that the government does not
need probable cause to initiate a border search but the agent
must “proceed in a reasonable manner” and support more-
intrusive searches with “some level of suspicion.”63 The appel-
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The border-search
exception allows
for a search of the
entire vehicle and
its contents without
obtaining a search
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late courts developed a test to evaluate the intrusiveness of a
border search through the routine/non-routine analysis based
on Montoya de Hernandez. 64
The Ninth Circuit extended the routine/non-routine analy-
sis to border vehicle searches in United States v. Molina-
Tarazon.65 The Ninth Circuit held that removing the gas tank
from a vehicle to inspect its interior was not routine and, there-
fore, required particularized suspicion.66 In Molina-Tarazon,
the agents became suspicious of Molina’s truck and searched it
to determine whether he had concealed drugs in the truck.67
The search was inconclusive.68 Unsatisfied, the agents directed
the truck to the inspection area.69 The mechanic put the truck
on a lift and removed the gas tank.70 After disassembling the
tank, the mechanic discovered drugs.71
The Ninth Circuit held that the border-search exception was
reasonable for routine searches, creating a three-part analysis
to determine whether or not the search was routine.72 The
three-part test required an evaluation of the amount of force
used, the danger the search posed, and the effect of the search
on the individual.73 After determining that the search was
non-routine, the court found that the agents established rea-
sonable suspicion prior to removing the gas tank.74 Since the
agents had established reasonable suspicion to conduct the
non-routine search, the court held the search was reasonable.75
Prior to Cortez-Rocha, the Ninth Circuit had considered that
slashing a spare tire was a routine search under the Molina-
Tarazon test in United States v. Vargas-Castillo.76 In Vargas-
Castillo, customs agents referred the defendant’s vehicle to a
secondary inspection area after becoming suspicious of the
vehicle.77 Based on the evidence established during the sec-
ondary inspection, a customs agent made a small incision into
the tire, discovered marijuana, and then cut the tire completely
open to uncover the rest of the drugs.78
In Vargas-Castillo, the Ninth Circuit answered a hypotheti-
cal question since neither party raised the suppression issue at
trial nor did the court cite any authority to allow it to address
the issue on appeal.79 Additionally, the appellate court did not
determine whether slashing the tire was routine or whether
agents had established sufficient reasonable suspicion to con-
duct the search.80 Thus, the
Ninth Circuit used a
routine/non-routine analysis
to determine whether property
searches conducted at the bor-
der were reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment and sug-
gested that slashing a tire
might be a reasonable search.81
C. United States v. Flores-
Montano’s Effect on
Border Searches
In United States v. Flores-Montano,82 the United States
Supreme Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s routine/non-routine
balancing test.83 The facts in Flores-Montano were similar to
those in Molina-Tarazon.84 After suspecting that Flores’s gas
tank contained drugs, the agents sent the car to a secondary
inspection area, put it on a lift, and summoned a mechanic to
disassemble the gas tank.85 After agents removed the tank, they
noticed an extra plate attached to the top of the tank with
bondo.86 The agents knocked off the plate and discovered the
hidden marijuana.87
Flores-Montano contains two important holdings for border
searches.  First, the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed
that the government does not have to establish probable cause
to conduct a border search and that the scope of a property bor-
der search is unlimited.88 Second, the government may remove,
inspect, and replace any operational part of the vehicle without
probable cause or judicial oversight when the government can
accomplish the process in a reasonable amount of time and with
little or repairable damage to the vehicle.89 Although Flores-
Montano eliminated Molina-Tarazon’s balancing test, 90 it did not
clarify what amount of destruction makes a search unreason-
able.91
On the facts presented, the Court determined the hour the
agents required to summon the mechanic, complete the disas-
sembly, search the tank, and reassemble the car was not unrea-
sonable.92 The Court remanded the case but refused to deter-
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64. See United States v. Flores-Montano, 124 S. Ct. 1582, 1584-85
(2004).
65. 279 F.3d 709 (9th Cir. 2002).
66. United States v. Molina-Tarazon, 279 F.3d 709, 712 (9th Cir. 2002)
overruled in part, United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149,
151-52 (2004).
67. Molina-Tarazon, 279 F.3d at 711.
68. Molina-Tarazon, 279 F.3d at 712.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 713.  The court acknowledged that there may be additional
factors that would add to the analysis. Id.
73. Id. at 713-16.
74. Id. at 717-18.
75. Id. at 717-18.
76. 329 F.3d 715, 722-23 (9th Cir. 2003).
77. Id. at 717.  
78. Id.
79. See id.; Appellant’s Opening Brief at 17, Cortez-Rocha.
80. Id.
81. See Vargas-Castillo, 329 F.3d at 722-23; United States v. Molina-
Tarazon, 279 F.3d 709, 713 (9th Cir. 2002).
82. 541 U.S. 149 (2004).  
83. United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152 (2004).
84. See id. at 150-51; Molina-Tarazon, 279 F.3d at 711-12.
85. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 151.
86. Id. Bondo is “a putty-like hardening substance that is used to seal
openings . . .” Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 153.
89. Id. at 154-55 (commenting the search took approximately one
hour and suggesting that a wait of two hours to enter the country
would not be unreasonable).
90. Id. at 152-53. 
91. Id. at 154 n.2 (refusing to discuss what type of manner might
make a search unreasonable).
92. Id. at 155.
Although Flores-
Montano
eliminated [the]
balancing test, it
did not clarify
what amount of
destruction makes
a search 
unreasonable.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. See supra notes 33-39.
96. Id.
97. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 618 n.13 (1977).
98. Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1 (1990).
99. See e.g., United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65, 71 (1998) (holding
that reasonable suspicion suspect was armed and dangerous sup-
ported exigent circumstances to justify seizure); United States v.
Bennett, 363 F.3d 947, 952 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding agents had
established probable cause to justify destructive search); Carroll v.
United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925) (holding that reasonable
suspicion justified slashing into car upholstery).  
100. See e.g., United States v. Rivas, 157 F.3d 364 (5th Cir. 1998)
(holding the government did not establish reasonable suspicion
to justify drilling).  Cf. United States v. Osage, 235 F.3d 518 (10th
Cir. 2000) (holding the officer did not have sufficient reasonable
suspicion to exceed the scope of consent by destroying the con-
tainer).
101. See United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149 (2004);
United States v. Pena, 920 F.2d 1509 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding
that removing a vent cover is a nondestructive search); United
States v. Torres, 663 F.2d 1019 (10th Cir. 1981) (holding that
using a screwdriver to remove a panel is a nondestructive
search).  See cf. Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1990) (forcing
open container absent existing police procedures was an unrea-
sonable search).
102. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153.  A similar search would currently fall
under the automobile exception.  
103. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 162.
104. See Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 154 n. 2.
105. Bennett, 363 F.3d at 952; Rivas, 157 F.3d 364; United States v.
Weinbender, 109 F.3d 1327, 1329 (8th Cir. 1997); Robles, 45 F.3d
1; Carreon, 872 F.2d 1436.
106. See, e.g., Rivas, 157 F.3d at 367; Robles, 45 F.3d at 5.
107. Compare Rivas, 1257 F.3d at 368 (holding the government did
not meet its burden to establish reasonable suspicion) with
Robles, 45 F.3d at 5 (holding the government met its burden of
reasonable suspicion).
108. Id.
109. See cases cited supra note 37.
110. See, e.g., Bennett, 363 F.3d at 952 (holding that agents had estab-
lished probable cause to justify search).
111. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 605, 618, n. 13 (1977).
112. 541 U.S. 149.
113. Compare Appellant’s Opening Brief, United States v. Cortez-
Rocha Brief for Appellee, United States v. Cortez-Rocha with
Appellant’s Reply Brief, United States v. Cortez-Rocha.
mine what level of destruction
during a search made it unrea-
sonable.93 Thus, although the
United States Supreme Court
overruled the routine/non-
routine balancing test, it did
not determine what level of
destruction makes a border
search unreasonable.94
D.  Defining Reasonable
Manner in Destruction of Property
Reasonableness has different standards depending on the
type, location, and circumstances of the search.95 Government
agents may establish reasonableness through exigent circum-
stances or by developing additional reasonable suspicion to
widen the scope of the search.96 However, a search may
become unreasonable depending on the manner in which
agents conduct the search97 or when the scope of the search
exceeds the basis for the search.98
In federal cases where a court has determined the govern-
ment established reasonable suspicion beyond the justification
for the initial search, it has admitted evidence obtained
through destructive searches.99 Conversely, courts have sup-
pressed the evidence when the government failed to show suf-
ficient reasonable suspicion to justify the destructive search.100
Additionally, courts have admitted evidence uncovered during
a nondestructive search.101
For example, the United States Supreme Court has held that
agents conducted a reasonable search when they slashed open
the interior of a car to determine whether suspects had hidden
contraband in the seats because the government had established
reasonable suspicion during the search.102 Thus, although the
manner of the search may appear unreasonable, the courts deter-
mined the agents established reasonable suspicion to widen the
scope of the search and did not base the reasonableness of the
search on the probable cause to stop the car.103
Additionally, the majority of federal appellate courts to
address destructive border searches have required the govern-
ment to establish reasonable suspicion before destroying a con-
tainer while conducting an otherwise reasonable search.104 In
each of the cases, the government drilled small holes or made
small incisions to determine the contents of the “container.”105
These cases presented the question whether the government
had conducted a routine or non-routine search based on the
interpretation of Montoya de Hernandez.106 However, where
courts allowed the evidence, it determined the agents had
established reasonable suspicion to believe the container con-
tained contraband.107 By establishing reasonable suspicion,
the agents were able to justify the continued intrusion into the
property and greater latitude to conduct the drilling.108
Even though reasonableness is a shifting standard, the gov-
ernment can conduct a wide array of searches through a war-
rant-requirement exception.109 Further, when in doubt,
obtaining a warrant gives an agent great latitude to conduct a
seemingly unreasonable search.110
III.  ANALYSIS
A.  Parties’ Arguments
United States v. Cortez-Rocha required the Ninth Circuit to
determine whether the destructive force used to open the spare
tire was unreasonable under Ramsey111 and Flores-Montano.112
After the government submitted its brief, the United States
Supreme Court ruled on Flores-Montano, which required the
parties to adjust their arguments.113 The Ninth Circuit ruled
that Flores-Montano applied only to operational parts of the
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132. Id. at 8-10.
133. Id. at 8-11 (citing United States v. Ramos-Saenz, 36 F.3d 59 (9th
Cir. 1994) (limiting non-routine searches to body or strip
searches and holding the destructive force to remove the sole of
the shoe was reasonable); United States v. Most 789 F.2d 1411
(9th Cir. 1986) (inserting a beeper into a paperweight was a rea-
sonable search). 
134. Brief for Appellee at 15-17 (citing United States v. Puig, 810 F.2d
1085, 1086-87 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding that drilling a small
hole into the hull of ship which could easily be repaired was rea-
sonable); United States v. Sarda-Villa, 760 F.2d 1232 (11th Cir.
1985) (holding that “reasonable suspicion justified using an axe
and a crowbar” to search underneath the deck for drugs); United
States v. Moreno, 778 F.2d 719, 721 (11th Cir. 1985) (drilling
two small holes in a gas tank to insert a probe to determine the
contents was a reasonable border search). 
vehicle and not to non-operational parts of the vehicle.114
Therefore, the holding in Flores-Montano did not cover the
destructive search of the spare tire.115 This ruling was wrong
because it ignored United States Supreme Court precedent
requiring the Fourth Amendment to be “liberally construed” to
preserve the integrity of Constitutional protections116 and
because of the offensive manner of the search.117 Finally, the
Ninth Circuit’s decision ignored analogous United States
Supreme Court precedent and similar interpretations of other
circuit courts requiring agents to establish reasonable suspi-
cion before conducting destructive searches of property.118
1.  Julio Cortez-Rocha
During the course of the appeal, the United States Supreme
Court ruled on United States v. Flores-Montano,119 which
changed the emphasis of the parties’ arguments.  Initially, Cortez
argued that slashing the spare tire was a non-routine search
because the search completely destroyed the container.120
Additionally, Cortez argued the destruction of the tire signifi-
cantly reduced his sense of safety and caused him to be fearful
of completing his journey without a spare tire.121 Cortez’s last
argument in his opening brief attempted to discount the holding
from United States v. Vargas-Castillo, since the Ninth Circuit had
refused to consider the suppression motion because the parties
had not raised the issue at trial.122 Cortez’s arguments all con-
tained the same theme: the Fourth Amendment protects indi-
viduals against “unreasonable destruction of property,” regard-
less of whether the seizure occurs at the border or inside the
country and that any destructive force used during a search
requires agents to establish reasonable suspicion or lose the evi-
dence to the exclusionary rule.123
Following the United States Supreme Court’s decision in
Flores-Montano, which struck down the routine/non-routine
analysis, 124 Cortez revised his argument. Cortez argued that
slashing the spare tire was the kind of destructive force the
United States Supreme Court suggested was unreasonable.125
However, in Flores-Montano the Court specifically refused to
identify the level of destruction that would make an otherwise
legal search unreasonable by the manner in which agents con-
ducted the search.126
Incorporating Flores-
Montano into his reply brief,
Cortez contended that a
destructive search required
individualized suspicion and
that Flores-Montano did not
address whether a destructive
search was unreasonable.127
Cortez further asserted that
although the routine/non-
routine framework had been
eliminated, the United States Supreme Court did not hold that
an individual loses all possessory interests in property, or that
a Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis was elimi-
nated.128 Cortez urged the Ninth Circuit to join the majority
of circuits requiring that government agents establish reason-
able suspicion before using destructive force to carry out a bor-
der search.129 Finally, Cortez requested that the court suppress
the evidence since the government could have obtained it
using other “least-intrusive” means.130
2.  United States
The government argued that the ruling in United States v.
Vargas-Castillo was binding and asserted that the holding of
that case classified the cutting open of a spare tire as a routine
search that did not require reasonable suspicion.131
Additionally, the government focused on limiting Montoya de
Hernandez to the intrusive search of a person and argued that
the balancing test established in Molina-Tarazon was inconsis-
tent with Montoya de Hernandez.132
Further, the government identified several cases within the
Ninth Circuit and from other circuits in which courts had held
that minimal destructive force was reasonable and routine
when the government conducted the search at the border.133
For example, the government argued that the Eleventh Circuit
has allowed searches, initially using minimal destructive force,
to destroy large portions of a boat during a border search.134
Finally, the government cited cases in the Seventh and Tenth
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124. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152-53 (2004).
125. Id. at 154 n.2, 156.
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127. Appellant’s Reply Brief at 4-5 
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circuits, in which minimal
destructive force to establish
the contents of luggage or a
camper shell and in which both
circuits determined that the
searches were reasonable bor-
der searches.135
The government concluded
that by limiting Montoya de
Hernandez’s routine/non-rou-
tine analysis to body searches
and strip searches, the United
States Supreme Court permit-
ted the government greater
freedom to use some destruc-
tive force to carry out a border
search.136 The government requested that Cortez’s conviction
stand because the search of the tire was reasonable and that
Montoya de Hernandez did not apply to property searches.137
B.  Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Majority Opinion
The Ninth Circuit specifically distinguished Flores-Montano
as pertaining only to the vehicle itself.138 According to the
majority, because the spare tire was unnecessary for immediate
travel and destruction of the spare tire did not damage or
destroy the vehicle, the search was reasonable, and no cause or
suspicion was necessary to search the spare tire.139 Although a
destructive search of property may require reasonable suspi-
cion, the Ninth Court held that since the United States
Supreme Court had focused its analysis on the vehicle, the
spare tire was not significant enough to be protected.140
Further, the court held that it was unworkable to require
agents to establish reasonable suspicion before opening any
locked container and that to do so would impair the govern-
ment’s ability to protect its border.141 Additionally, the Ninth
Circuit distinguished the “drilling cases”142 as irrelevant
because those cases were based on a similar routine/non-rou-
tine determination specifically overruled in Flores-Montano.143
The court justified its position as adhering to the admoni-
tion from the United States Supreme Court in Flores-Montano
to avoid creating additional balancing tests to determine rea-
sonableness.144 The court noted the spare tire was a favored
smuggling area for both drug runners and terrorists.145 The
court suggested that accepting Cortez’s argument would
encourage smugglers to conceal contraband in the spare tire
and allow contraband and terrorists into the country
unchecked.146 Finally, the court held that although the search
may have resulted in a constitutional tort or taking, the agents’
actions were not severe enough to justify suppressing the evi-
dence.147 The majority implicitly decided that a civil suit
against the government was a sufficient remedy for the com-
plete destruction of the tire.148 The Ninth Circuit determined
that the search was reasonable and affirmed the guilty plea.149
C.  Dissenting Opinion
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Sidney Thomas argued the
majority had created an overbroad and unnecessary power
within the border-search exception.150 Judge Thomas
anchored his opinion on the United States Supreme Court
acknowledgment that the facts in Flores-Montano showed that
the search was nondestructive and that a destructive search
may lead to a different result.151 Since the search in Cortez-
Rocha was completely destructive, Judge Thomas argued that
the existing totality-of-the-circumstances test was the appro-
priate test.152 The dissent identified three factors to consider
in the analysis: “the degree of destruction, the ease [of repair],
and the convenience, cost, and efficiency of non-destructive or
less-destructive methods that were available . . . .”153 Applying
his method, Judge Thomas determined the agents should have
established reasonable cause before cutting into the tire.154
Judge Thomas next attacked the majority’s characterization
of the tire as a nonessential component of a vehicle since the
spare tire is a safety feature.155 Finally, Judge Thomas warned
against the majority’s war-on-terrorism justification stating,
“[t]he challenge in such times is not to allow our fear to over-
come our values.”156
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147. Cortez-Rocha, 394 F.3d at 1128 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting
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153. Id. at 1126.  
154. Id. at 1126-27.
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COMMENTARY
Constitutional protections do not evaporate at the border.157
Although the government may have broad power to conduct
general searches at the border, this power should not allow the
destruction of personal property when nondestructive meth-
ods exist to open the container.158 The Ninth Circuit wrongly
protected the evidence for trial to supposedly avoid creating
another balancing test.159 However, the Ninth Circuit failed to
recognize that all Fourth Amendment cases are balancing tests,
and suppressing the evidence would not have created a new
exception or protected area.160 Rather, the Ninth Circuit
would have affirmed that Fourth Amendment protections do
exist at the border.  Instead, Cortez-Rocha represents a quiet,
yet dangerous erosion of Fourth Amendment protections
against unreasonable searches and seizures.
The decision in Cortez-Rocha was wrong for three reasons.
First, the Ninth Circuit ignored United States Supreme Court
precedent that requires Fourth Amendment protections be lib-
erally construed to preserve the integrity of the Constitution.161
Second, the Ninth Circuit failed to conduct a reasonable-suspi-
cion analysis even though it had conducted a reasonable-suspi-
cion analysis to justify a “potentially destructive” border search
prior to Cortez-Rocha.162 Finally, analogous United States
Supreme Court decisions and decisions from other federal cir-
cuits do not support the Ninth Circuit’s holding.163
The first error committed by the Ninth Circuit was its fail-
ure to conduct a balancing test to evaluate the search.164 The
court must interpret the Fourth Amendment in favor of the
individual rather than the government.165 When applying the
Fourth Amendment to the facts, the government must prove
either that probable cause existed to conduct the search or that
the search fell within a well-delineated exception.166 Because
the United States Supreme Court has twice avoided the deci-
sion of whether a destructive search is reasonable,167 the
boundaries of the border exception are blurry and the pre-
sumption should have gone to the individual rather than the
government.168 By resolving the “tie” in favor of the govern-
ment, the Ninth Circuit violated precedent and further
reduced Fourth Amendment
protections at the border.169
Expanding searches at the
border creates the possibility
for abuse that falls outside the
scope of judicial review.170
Absent a judicial ruling sup-
porting Fourth Amendment
protections, the Ninth Circuit
has created a dangerous
precedent for future cases
regarding the government’s ability to destroy property at the
border.  The spare tire in this case is not the concern.  Under
the authority of Cortez-Rocha, an agent could destroy a three-
legged clay pig to conduct a search for no reason other than the
laziness of an agent.  Further, Cortez-Rocha suggests that the
court would not suppress the evidence obtained in an offensive
search.  
To justify the search, the Ninth Circuit did not need to con-
duct a complex analysis.171 It could have adopted the test
urged by Cortez himself: whether the entire situation, condi-
tions, and actions of the agents sufficiently established reason-
able suspicion to justify the destruction of his property.172
Using a totality-of-the-circumstances approach would allow a
court to evaluate whether agents established sufficient cause to
use destructive force to open the container.173 Agents should
be required to attempt to open the container without employ-
ing destructive force.174 If the container is completely closed,
the officer should be required to establish reasonable suspicion
before causing any damage to the property.175
Such a test acknowledges existing precedent that allows
government agents to conduct exploratory drilling into
camper shells or to open packages entering the country.176 In
those cases, the courts evaluated the evidence the officer had
and determined that the officer had articulable facts to support
a reasonable suspicion for the exploratory drilling.177 This
essential analysis was missing in Cortez-Rocha.178 Failing to
conduct the reasonable suspicion analysis, regardless of the
Court Review 35
Expanding
searches at the
border creates the
possibility for
abuse that falls
outside the scope
of judicial review.
157. See United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 605, 618 n.13 (1977);
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(9th. Cir. 2005).
173. United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 36 (2003) (citations omit-
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180. Compare United States v. Cortez-Rocha 394 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir.
2005) with United States v. Bennett, 363 F.3d 947, 951-52 (9th
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initial justification for the
search, defeats the purpose
of judicial oversight.179
Thus, the trial court and
the Ninth Circuit failed to
perform their constitu-
tional function.  
The Ninth Circuit also
erred in its decision when
it held, against its own
precedent, that reasonable
suspicion was not required when conducting a potentially
destructive search.180 The Ninth Circuit did not acknowledge
that it reviews a district court’s “determination of the legality of
a search de novo.”181 By raising the issue of a destructive
search pretrial and requesting the district court to conduct an
evidentiary hearing, Cortez preserved the issue for review.182
De novo review required the Ninth Circuit to apply existing
precedent to the Cortez case.183 By failing to conduct a rea-
sonable-suspicion analysis, the Ninth Circuit violated the rule
of stare decisis and incorrectly applied existing law.  The Ninth
Circuit error has two facets.  First, the Ninth Circuit failed to
distinguish United States v. Bennett from the facts in Cortez-
Rocha, which creates an inconsistency in the Ninth Circuit.
Instead, the Ninth Circuit cited Bennett to acknowledge that a
destructive search may be offensive and, therefore, unreason-
able without acknowledging that in Bennett the court found
reasonable suspicion to conduct an arguably destructive
search.184 Failing to distinguish Bennett from Cortez-Rocha
deprives district courts a clear interpretation to use in similar
cases. 
Second, the Ninth Circuit incorrectly applied United States
v. Vargas-Castillo.185 The Ninth Circuit cited Vargas-Castillo to
demonstrate that the search of a spare tire did not rise to the
level of intrusiveness to make a search unreasonable.186 The
Ninth Circuit erred by citing Vargas-Castillo, a legal justifica-
tion that the United States Supreme Court rejected in Flores-
Montano.187 In Vargas-Castillo, the Ninth Circuit merely deter-
mined that had Vargas raised the issue at trial, it would have
found slashing the tire open to be a routine and reasonable
search.188 Thus, the precedent cited should have been unavail-
able to the court to use as support for its conclusion.
Finally, the Ninth Circuit incorrectly justified the entire
search based on the border-search exception without deter-
mining whether or not the manner of the search was reason-
able.189 The United States Supreme Court has emphasized that
the touchstone of any Fourth Amendment analysis is reason-
ableness.190 Reasonableness requires a probable-cause deter-
mination by a detached magistrate unless it falls within one of
the few well-delineated exceptions.191 The border search is
one of those exceptions.192 However, a border search is simi-
lar to a regulatory search, such as an inventory search, there-
fore restricting agents in the manner in which they carry out a
search.193 Excessive destruction can make an otherwise legal
search unreasonable under both United States v. Ramsey194 and
United States v. Ramirez.195 The question is what level of
destruction is reasonable?196 The government cannot justify
the destruction of the spare tire without an additional finding
of reasonable suspicion.  
The slashing of the tire was excessive and unnecessary.  It
was reasonable for the border agents to conduct an extensive
search of the vehicle because Cortez was attempting to enter
the country.197 Border agents were entitled to use force to
remove the spare tire from its secured location on the vehicle
under the Flores-Montano analysis.198 Under Flores-Montano,
agents would have been within the boundaries of the Fourth
Amendment to call a mechanic to the scene to dismount the
tire from the wheel, or if properly trained, to dismount the tire
themselves since the search would have been nondestructive.
However, instead of proceeding with caution and restraint, the
agents slashed open the tire to ascertain its contents and
destroyed the tire beyond repair.199 The United States Supreme
Court’s dicta in Ramsey and Flores-Montano regarding the
potential unreasonableness of a search caused by the destruc-
tion of property is not limited to the operational parts of a
vehicle, but rather to property as an entire class.200
The Ninth Circuit erred by failing to consider the evaluation
of destructive force in other federal appellate decisions.  A
comparison of similar cases from other jurisdictions demon-
strates that the Ninth Circuit’s holding is inconsistent with
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United State Supreme Court precedent and other circuit
courts.201 Additionally, the Ninth Circuit’s holding is inconsis-
tent with the balancing test used to determine the reasonable-
ness of a regulatory search.202 Comparing these holdings
demonstrates the Ninth Circuit unnecessarily increased the
exceptions to the reasonableness requirement.  
The Ninth Circuit dismissively rejected other circuit opin-
ions without carefully considering the holdings or fact pat-
terns.203 When the other circuits admitted evidence from
destructive searches, the courts held that reasonable suspicion
justified the destructive force.204 The United States Supreme
Court’s rejection of the routine/non-routine analysis is imma-
terial because the circuit courts employed reasonable suspicion
in analyzing destructive searches.205 While the border-search
exception justified the initial stop, the court found reasonable
suspicion to allow the destructive search.206
The failure of the Ninth Circuit to see the reasonable-suspi-
cion determination in the other circuits’ opinions demon-
strates that the Ninth Circuit unnecessarily dismissed persua-
sive authority.  Considering the holdings from the other cir-
cuits and the specific findings of reasonable suspicion to jus-
tify the exploratory drilling, the agents in Cortez-Rocha should
have limited the amount of destructive force used to dis-
mounting the tire or making a small repairable incision.207
The agents could have dismounted the tire without using
destructive force and accomplished the search, which would
have been as reasonable as removing the lid from a container
or opening the folds of a paper bag.208
The Ninth Circuit was thus obligated to find reasonable sus-
picion to justify the destructive search or to justify the destruc-
tive search based on the agents’ safety or the likelihood that the
evidence would disappear.209 The court could have accom-
plished this analysis by determining whether the search was
subject to the automobile exception or whether it was subject
to the limitations of a regulatory search.
The automobile exception, justified by the ease evidence
can be moved, would have been unavailable.  For all practical
purposes, Cortez was detained.  He was handcuffed and being
held away from his vehicle.210 His vehicle was in a secondary-
inspection area, removed from the main entry point into the
country.211 Further, the government was exercising complete
control over the vehicle, and there was no reason to believe
that Cortez’s truck would be stolen or that the evidence would
disappear.212 Thus, the agents could have easily called in a
telephone warrant and established probable cause for a
detached magistrate to issue a warrant to open the tire.213
Alternatively, the government could have justified the search
during the suppression motion both on the border exception
for the initial search and reasonable suspicion to believe that
contraband existed in the tire to justify the slashing open of the
tire.214
Because the Ninth Circuit ignored Fourth Amendment
interpretation precedent, its own border-search precedent, and
analogous case law from the United States Supreme Court and
other circuits, the Ninth Circuit unnecessarily fashioned a new
rule of law.  The Ninth Circuit had multiple tools to admit the
evidence without creating a dangerous precedent for future
border searches.  Because the Ninth Circuit failed to use these
tools, it reduced the constitutional protections at the border
without sufficient justification.
IV.  CONCLUSION
The rejection of the non-routine/routine analysis in Flores-
Montano requires courts to reevaluate their assessment of bor-
der searches.  Cases prior to Cortez-Rocha have allowed
searches when agents cause some, but repairable, damage to an
individual’s property.  However, the facts in Cortez-Rocha
demonstrate the search exceeded the bounds of reason when
agents completely destroyed the tire.  It is reasonable to expect
agents to use only the amount of force necessary to conduct
the search.215 Any force greater than necessary to safely open
the container is unreasonable per se and courts should sup-
press the evidence obtained from a destructive search absent
an additional finding of reasonable suspicion.216
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Coeur d’Alene (pronounced core-da-
lane), 31 miles east of Spokane,
Washington, is a lakefront resort commu-
nity in one of the prettiest settings in the
Western United States—overlooking
Lake Coeur d’Alene and flanked by the
foothills of the Bitterroot  Mountains.
Our 2006 midyear conference will be at
the Coeur d’Alene Resort, called
America’s top mainland resort by Conde
Nast Traveler and one of America’s top
10 golf resorts by Golf Digest magazine.
AJA’s midyear meeting usually includes
one or two continuing judicial education
programs, plus business meetings of the
AJA Board of Governors.
NEW  ORLEANS, LOUISIANA
OCTOBER 8-13, 2006
AJA will return to New Orleans, site of
some of our most successful annual con-
ferences, for the 2006 annual conference.
We look forward to renewing acquain-
tance with many of our Louisiana mem-
bers who—along with their courts—have
been displaced. AJA’s annual conference
usually includes 12 to 15 hours of contin-
uing judicial education, business meetings
of the AJA Board of Governors and
General Assembly (all members), cultural
programs, entertainment, and free time to
explore.
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FUTURE CONFERENCES
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October 8-13, 2006
Hotel Monteleone
$169 single/double
Newport, Rhode Island
2007 Midyear Meeting
April 18-20, 2007
Hotel Viking
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Vancouver, British Columbia
2007 Annual Conference
September 24-29, 2007
Sheraton Vancouver Wall Centre
$229 Canadian single/double
Maui, Hawaii
2008 Annual Conference
September 7-12, 2008
Westin Maui
$190 single/double
Court Review, the quarterly journal of the American Judges
Association, invites the submission of unsolicited, original articles,
essays, and book reviews.  Court Review seeks to provide practical,
useful information to the working judges of the United States and
Canada.  In each issue, we hope to provide information that will be
of use to judges in their everyday work, whether in highlighting new
procedures or methods of trial, court, or case management, provid-
ing substantive information regarding an area of law likely to
encountered by many judges, or by providing background informa-
tion (such as psychology or other social science research) that can be
used by judges in their work.
Court Review is received by the 2,000 members of the American
Judges Association (AJA), as well as many law libraries.  About 40
percent of the members of the AJA are general-jurisdiction, state trial
judges.  Another 40 percent are limited-jurisdiction judges, includ-
ing municipal court and other specialized court judges.  The remain-
der include federal trial judges, state and federal appellate judges,
and administrative-law judges.
Articles:  Articles should be submitted in double-spaced text with
footnotes, preferably in Word format (although WordPerfect format
can also be accepted).  The suggested article length for Court Review
is between 18 and 36 pages of double-spaced text (including the
footnotes).  Footnotes should conform to the current edition of The
Bluebook:  A Uniform System of Citation.  Articles should be of a qual-
ity consistent with better-state-bar association law journals and/or
other law reviews.
Essays:  Essays should be submitted in the same format as articles.
Suggested length is between 6 and 12 pages of double-spaced text
(including any footnotes).
Book Reviews:  Book reviews should be submitted in the same for-
mat as articles.  Suggested length is between 3 and 9 pages of dou-
ble-spaced text (including any footnotes).
Pre-commitment:  For previously published authors, we will con-
sider making a tentative publication commitment based upon an
article outline.  In addition to the outline, a comment about the spe-
cific ways in which the submission will be useful to judges and/or
advance scholarly discourse on the subject matter would be appreci-
ated.  Final acceptance for publication cannot be given until a com-
pleted article, essay, or book review has been received and reviewed
by the Court Review editor or board of editors.
Editing: Court Review reserves the right to edit all manuscripts.  
Submission:  Submissions may be made either by mail or e-mail.
Please send them to Court Review’s editor:  Judge Steve Leben, 100
North Kansas Avenue, Olathe, Kansas 66061, e-mail address:
sleben@ix.netcom.com, (913) 715-3822.  Submissions will be
acknowledged by mail; letters of acceptance or rejection will be sent
following review.
Court Review Author Submission Guidelines
40 Court Review  
The Resource Page
g
EMERGENCY PLANNING
Lawrence Siegel, Caroline S. Cooper &
Allison L. Hastings, Planning for
Emergencies: Immediate Events and Their
Aftermath—A Guideline for Local Courts
http://spa.american.edu/justice/csdp.
php 
Technical assistance work with more
than 20 state trial courts led to the
development of this 35-page “how to”
guide for preparing a local court for var-
ious types of emergencies—fires, hurri-
canes, tornadoes, terrorists—and their
aftermath.  American University’s Justice
Programs Office provides technical
assistance to local courts through the
Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA)
Criminal Courts Technical Assistance
Project.   That work, plus a State Justice
Institute grant to compile the experience
into a useful manual for other courts,
led to this publication.
To be sure, no two “emergencies” (or
courts, for that matter) will be identical.
The authors contend, however, that the
keys to successful responses are a plan
that can be activated to deal with issues
that could be anticipated and ongoing
communication among various agencies
to make the plan work.   Planning for
Emergencies provides an excellent start
for any local court to use in the process.
It provides step-by-step planning guides
for dealing with various emergency situ-
ations, along with hypothetical scenar-
ios to work through, a self-assessment
planning guide, and sample plans and
orders from other courts.
Limited technical assistance is avail-
able, free of charge, to courts interesting
in adapting Planning for Emergncies to
their locales from the BJA Criminal
Courts Technical Assistance Project at
American University.  For further infor-
mation, contact Caroline S. Cooper or
Allison Hastings at American University,
(202) 885-2875, or justice@american.
edu. 
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BOOKS OF NOTE
GOOD COURTS: THE CASE FOR PROBLEM-
SOLVING JUSTICE. Greg Berman & John
Feinblatt. The New Press, 2005
($24.95).  218 pp.
A PROBLEM-SOLVING REVOLUTION: MAKING
CHANGE HAPPEN IN STATE COURTS. Greg
Berman, Aubrey Fox & Robert V. Wolf,
eds.  Center for Court Innovation, 2004
(no charge).  300 pp.
Two new books from New York’s
Center for Court Innovation make the
case for problem-solving courts.  While
the authors—at least in their latest
work, Good Courts—concede that ques-
tions of effectiveness remain to be fur-
ther explored, they make a strong case
for further application of the concepts
behind problem-solving courts (also
known in some states as collaborative-
justice courts).  
Good Courts is written by Greg
Berman, director of the Center for Court
Innovation, and John Feinblatt, New
York City’s criminal justice coordinator.
Both were involved in setting up New
York’s Midtown Community Court and
the Red Hook Community Justice
Center in Brooklyn.  Each of those pro-
grams has been recognized for success-
fully applying problem-solving justice in
handling misdemeanor criminal cases.
Courts like these, along with drug
courts and domestic-violence courts,
form the bulk of the established prob-
lem-solving courts that Berman and
Feinblatt review.  They also note devel-
oping application of these concepts to
mental-health courts, reentry courts,
DWI courts, family courts, and housing
courts.  To these authors, the essence of
a problem-solving approach is “to
ensure not just that the punishment fits
the crime . . . but that the process fits the
problem.”  Thus, judicial resources are
matched to the needs of each case and
partnerships with new players (like
community groups, treatment providers,
or job-training programs) are encour-
aged.  
The authors include serious discus-
sion of the limits to evidence that these
courts work and criticisms of them in
terms of fairness to individual defen-
dants.  Good Courts is an excellent, up-
to-date introduction to the possibilities
of problem-solving justice.
A Problem-Solving Revolution, a col-
lection of ten essays and discussion tran-
scripts, presents an excellent companion
volume.  It focuses primarily on how
problem-solving-court concepts can be
taken from individual experiments to
wide-scale implementation.  As Berman
says in the introduction, “Going to scale
with an innovative idea or practice in
any field is difficult.”  The essays and
group discussions in this volume no
doubt will help in that process.  
LOOKING FOR LOST EAGLES 
Florida Circuit Court Judge Richard
Howard is looking for former Eagle
Scouts, who are invited to join the
National Eagle Scout Association
(NESA).  The NESA is an
alumni organization for
Eagle Scouts of all ages,
created in 1972 by the
National Executive
Board of the Boy Scouts
of America.  NESA seeks
to identify, locate, and mobi-
lize the talents and resources
of Eagle Scouts.
Anyone who has ever attained the
rank of Eagle Scout is eligible for mem-
bership.  Current registration in the Boy
Scouts of America is not required; NESA
members receive the “Eagle Letter,” the
official publication of NESA.
As Judge Howard puts it, “Remember,
there are no ‘former Eagles.’ Once an
Eagle, always an Eagle!”  For more
information or to join NESA, contact
Hon. Richard A. Howard, Circuit Judge,
Fifth Judicial Circuit, 110 North Apopka
Ave., Inverness, Florida 34450.
